The enemies
of France , for example Iran , Turkey ,
Sudan , the Hezbollah of
Lebanon, can support terrorist attacks against France Libya was another potential
sponsor of terrorism against France ,
but after 2000 the relations between France
and Libya
Obviously
there are many African countries that can support terrorist attacks against France too, but I am talking about countries
that are significant military powers, so that they can provide advanced weapons
and intelligence support, which are necessary for spectacular attacks against France
In 2015
there was the agreement for the nuclear program of Iran France
opposed the Iran deal in
order to protect her Arab allies, but also because Iran
challenges France in North
Africa, where France France France France
The
agreement for the Iranian nuclear program opened the road for the economic
cooperation between France
and Iran Sudan , a strong
Iranian ally during the previous decades, and a strong supporter of international
terrorism, changed sides and aligned itself with Saudi
Arabia , and Saudi Arabia
These
developments changed the ability of Al-Qaeda to attack France , because Iran
and Sudan
However I
have to say that Al-Qaeda of North Africa (Al-Qaeda of Islamic Maghreb) is a
different organization from Al-Qaeda of Asia .
In Asia Al-Qaeda is fighting the Americans who are trying to bring the oil and
natural gas of Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan to India i.e. TAPI Pipeline, while in Africa
Al-Qaeda is fighting the French who support the construction of the
Trans-Saharan Pipeline, which will send the natural gas of Nigeria to Algeria
and Europe. See “A Summary of the Wars of the 21st Century”.
For the
difference between Al-Qaeda Africa and Al-Qaeda Asia see Rand Corporation “North Africa ’s Menace : AQIM's Evolution and the U.S.
Policy Response”.
Therefore
before the agreement for Iran ’s
nuclear program and before the repositioning of Sudan ’s
foreign policy, Iran , Sudan and Hezbollah were the most powerful
supporters of Jihadist groups who were fighting France
in Africa . Now of course there is also the
Islamic State, which was supported by Turkey
and the Arabs, but I will come back to ISIS
later on. But note that France
is bombing ISIS in Syria ,
and therefore ISIS can support attacks against France ISIS
consists of the ex-people of Saddam Hussein who were overturned by the
Americans with the Iraq War of 2003. Saddam Hussein was a soviet ally and these
people were trained by the Soviets and the KGB. See “Towards an Alliance Between Russia
and ISIS ”?
Note that Saudi Arabia , another country which supports
Jihadist organizations has a limited ability to support Al-Qaeda, because Saudi Arabia is an ally of the United States and France Saudi Arabia buys her
weapons from the United States
and France , while Iran , Hezbollah and Sudan
are buying their weapons from Russia
and China Iran , Hezbollah
and Sudan had a lot more
freedom to support Al-Qaeda against their enemies i.e. the United States and France ,
while the Saudis would lose the American and French support if they were to
support Al-Qaeda against the United States
and France
Moreover Saudi Arabia Iran , Qatar
and Russia Saudi
Arabia Saudi Arabia is the second richest country in
oil reserves, second only to Venezuela
Image
Richest in Natural Gas
Image
Richest in Oil
Therefore the Saudis do not really have to
stop the TAPI Pipeline (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India), or the
Trans-Saharan Pipeline (Nigeria-Niger-Algeria). It is the Iranians, the Qataris
and the Iranians and the Russians that have to worry about them. The Turks must
also stop the Tran-Saharan Pipeline because the Turks’ main ambition is to send
the natural gas of the Middle East and Central Asia to Europe ,
and provide an alternative to the Russian gas.
Map TAPI
Pipeline
Map Trans-Saharan
Pipeline
Therefore,
when I say that it was mainly Iran ,
Sudan and Hezbollah who were
supporting Al-Qaeda against France
in Africa, I am not saying that Saudi Arabia
is a better country than Iran
At the
following map you can see how important Sudan
was for Iran Iran
and Hezbollah used Sudan as
an entrance for West Africa in order to attack Niger ,
Nigeria , Algeria and Cameroon Eritrea and Somalia
they were attacking Kenya
and Ethiopia
Map Sudan ’s Usefulness for Iran
From the mid-seventies
Egypt left the Soviets and
became an ally of the United States
and Saudi Arabia , and has also
singed a peach treaty with Israel Egypt
became an enemy of Saudi Arabia ,
when the Muslim Brotherhood rose to power with the support of Turkey , Qatar
and Iran
When the
Muslim Brother Mohamed Morsi became president of Egypt
in 2012 he received Erdogan in Egypt Egypt Egypt
has been an enemy of Iran
Moreover
Qadafi had formed an alliance with Chad ,
and together they supported separatist rebel groups in South
Sudan , which is where the Sudanese oil is located. See Gatestone Institute
“Chad
See also “Libya , Chad
and Sudan
It is no coincidence
that it was in 2011 that the special forces of Hezbollah and Sudan , with the blessings of Iran , and the special forces of Qatar , with the blessings of Turkey , entered Libya ,
and it was in 2011 that South Sudan gained its
independence. It was the same war.
Qaddafi’s Libya was producing 1.5 million barrels of oil
per day before the Arab Spring, Sudan
was producing 400 thousand barrels per day, while Chad
After the
Arab Spring and the independence of South Sudan
both the Libyan and Sudanese oil productions collapsed.
Image
Libyan Oil Production
Image
Sudanese Oil Production
At the following
map you can see with blue the Sudanese oil fields and with red the oil pipeline
that was exporting the Sudanese oil to the Red Sea through the Arab part of Sudan
Map Oil
Fields and Pipeline of Sudan
Map
Pipelines of the Red Sea
From the following
map you can see that Sudan was
for Iran and Hezbollah an entrance
to West Africa, which allowed them to bypass South Sudan, Ethiopia and Chad
Map Sudan as a Corridor to West
Africa
In West
Africa Iran targets the oil
of Nigeria , the
Trans-Saharan gas pipeline (Nigeria-Niger-Algeria), and the rich uranium fields
of Niger
Uranium
Production by Country
Map
I must also
say that Sudan is useful for
Iran Sudan and
Iran Sudan
is a Sunni Islamic “Democracy” while Iran
Therefore Iran could use Sudan
to set foot in Sunni terrorist organization of Africa and Asia ,
because 80-85% of the Muslim population adheres to Sunni Islam. The Sudanese
propaganda sounds more familiar to the population of the Sunni countries.
Moreover Iran and Sudan used to jointly attack the Saudi King, and
Sudan Sudan
and Iran
In recent
years Turkey became also a
predator hunting the Saudi King, because the Turkish President wanted to unite Saudi Arabia , Qatar
and Iran , under the Muslim
Brotherhood, in order to send the natural gas of Iran
and Qatar to Turkey
I want to
mention some relevant articles before moving further.
At the
following article of the Africa Journalism, you can read that Sudan supports terrorism organizations all over
Africa, and soon Iran ’s
weapons could even reach Boko Haram in Nigeria ISIS . See “The Sudanese
link: from Seleka in Central Africa Republic to Boko Haram in Nigeria”,
May 2014.
At the
following Reuters article you can read that the Organization of Islamic
Council, which is a council of all the Muslim countries, officially accused Iran Iran
At the
following BBC article you can read that Iran
smuggles gun in Nigeria in
order to arm terrorist groups, and Nigeria
threatened to report Iran Nigeria
to question Iranian over arms seized in Lagos
At the
following Reuters article you can read that the United Nations accuse Iran for supplying arms to Al-Shabaab in Somalia Iran denies shipping arms
to Islamist militants in Somalia
After the
wild Sunni-Shia war in Syria ,
Al-Qaeda and ISIS started competing for
influence over Al-Shabaab. See the Telegraph “How al-Qaeda and Islamic State
are competing for al-Shabaab in Somalia
At the
following BBC article you can read that Gambia
severed diplomatic relations with Iran
because Iran was smuggling
weapons in Gambia Gambia cuts ties
with Iran
At the
following Al-Jazeera article you can read that Senegal
severed diplomatic ties with Iran
because Iran was smuggling
weapons in Senegal Senegal severs ties with
Iran
At the
following CNN article you can read that Kenya
many times in the past has accused Iran
for supporting terrorists that have been arrested in Kenya Iran
At the
following Guardian article you can read that the public prosecutor of Argentina
was ready to present to the Argentinean Congress evidence that the Argentinean
President Cristina Kirchner was involved in hiding evidence of Iranian
involvement in Argentinean terrorism, but a few hours before going to the
Congress the Public Prosecutor committed “suicide”. See “Alberto Nisman: Argentina
At the
following article from the Nigerian Naij, one of the largest newspapers of Nigeria , you can read that the secret services
of Nigeria blamed Iran for training terrorists in Nigeria
I would
also like to provide a map with the ethnic groups of Sudan
Map Sudan
That’s a
very basic description of the divisions of the Sudanese population. There are hundreds
of tribes in the country. Most African people did not have nations until the
Westerners went there. African people were very primitive. They would hunt and
eat each other, or sell the captured tribes as slaves.
I must also
mention the issue of the South Sudan-Kenya oil pipeline promoted by China , which hurts the Arabs of Sudan who want
the oil of South Sudan to be exported by the
Arab northern part of the country. There was also the prospect of connecting Uganda Kenya
and Uganda
Map South
Sudan-Uganda-Kenya Pipelines
Therefore Kenya was a common enemy for Iran and Sudan ,
because she would export the resources of Africa to the Indian Ocean (Iran ) and she would export the oil of Sudan and Uganda ,
which could be exported by Sudan Tanzania could also
be used for this purpose and that’s why Al-Shabaab attacks Tanzania
The
following map is the map of Al-Qaeda, and it includes Kenya and Tanzania ,
Sudan and Uganda , the oil and natural gas of Algeria , Libya
and Nigeria , the
Trans-Saharan Pipeline, and the uranium of Niger
Map of
Al-Qaeda
At the following
map you can see how important the Central African
Republic is for Iran
and Sudan , in order for them
to enter West Africa .
Map Central
African Republic CAR
The Central African Republic was among other things
a battle ground between France
on one hand, and Iran and Sudan Central African Republic
is 85% Christian and 15% Muslim, and that is an advantage for France Sudan , Iran
and Hezbollah had a great geographical advantage due to Sudan
Djotodia
managed to rise to power with the help of mercenaries from Sudan and Chad Central African Republic
For
Djotodia also see BBC “Profile: Central
African Republic
Note that
the government of Chad was
an ally of Qaddafi, but Sudan
supported many rebel groups in Chad ,
in the same way that Qaddafi and Chad
supported rebel groups in South Sudan .
There was
also the issue of the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline, which would export Chad ’s oil to Cameroon
and the Atlantic Ocean, and why not the oil of South Sudan
too? In the same way the Chinese could export the oil of South Sudan to the
Indian Ocean through Kenya ,
the French and the Americans could export the oil of South Sudan to the
Atlantic Ocean through Cameroon ,
in order for South Sudan not to be dependent on Sudan
Obviously
the Arabs of Sudan would prefer to see the oil of South Sudan, Chad and Uganda
exiting Africa through the Arab part of Sudan
and Port Sudan instead through Cameroon and Kenya Sudan , Chad
and Ugand to exit Africa from Kenya
and the India Ocean ,
because Libya is mainly
exporting to Europe .
Map
Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline
And as I
said together with Sudan
there was Iran , which wanted
to attack the Trans-Saharan natural gas pipeline (Nigeria-Niger-Algeria) which
was very bad for Iran , but
also for Qatar and Russia Turkey
too, because Turkey wanted
to send the natural gas of the Middle East and the Caspian Sea to Europe . That’s why you see these strange, or “unholy”,
alliances in Africa, and the war in the Central African Republic
However
when Djotodia took the Central African Republic ,
with the blessings of Sudan ,
Iran and Russia , the French were not quick to respond,
contrary to what they did to Mali France :
Why intervene in Mali and
not Central African Republic
I guess
that Mali , due to its
proximity to the uranium fields of Niger
was a lot more important than CAR for France
I must also
say that diamonds are the most important export good of the Central African Republic Central African Republic Sudan
and Iran in order to pay the
terrorist groups they supported in Africa .
Osama bin
Laden was buying lots of diamonds. See the Guardian “Bin Laden's $20m African
'blood diamond' deals”, October 2002.
If you read
the articles I mentioned about Djotodia you will see that Djotodia had
professional experience in the diamond industry.
I have
already described the Arab Spring of Libya. For a full description see “Iran
But I would
like to write a quick summary. Muammar Qaddafi, the Libyan socialist dictator,
had made an agreement with the French President Nichola Sarkozy, according to
which France would construct
a nuclear production plant in Libya ,
and I guess in return Qaddafi would stop supporting the Tuaregs or other
insurgents of West Africa against France
Moreover
Qaddafi was an enemy of Sudan
and Hezbollah, two very strong Iranian allies, and he was also an enemy of Qatar Chad ,
were supporting rebel groups in South Sudan, and with its alliance with Chad , Qaddafi was a constraint for Iran ’s ambition in West
Africa .
Moreover in
2003 Qaddafi betrayed the Pakistanis, who were selling to Iran and Libya
Map Ethnic
Groups of Libya
All the
above problems in the Libyan-Iranian relations weighted more than the traditional
alliance between Libya and Iran against the Saudi King, since their
traditional alliance against the United States Iran was very
happy when the special forces of Sudan ,
Hezbollah and Qatar entered Libya Libya
he could not match Iran , Turkey , Sudan ,
Hezbollah and Qatar
And that’s
why Algeria Libya Algeria ,
Chad , Mali , Niger ,
Kenya Zimbabwe and
Algeria sending troops to support
Gaddafi in Libya
After all Algeria
When the
special forces of Sudan and
Hezbollah entered Libya
there was a race between the French and the Islamists for Libya Libya Tunisia
and Egypt
While there
was this race for Libya
between the French and the Islamists, the Iranians were shouting that NATO
should stay out of Libya ,
while the Turks were demanding that France Turkey
attacks France on Libya
Obviously
if the French were leading the operations against Qaddafi they could exchange
air coverage for support on the ground from the rebels. Italy did not want to attack Qaddafi, but when
Qaddafi said that he would give the contracts of ENI to Russia and China
if they saved him Italy
When
Qaddafi fall, Iran, Turkey, Sudan and Qatar got hold of whole storehouses of
his weapons, and started passing them to the rebel groups of Africa they
supported, or transferring them to Sudan. For a great article see World Tribune
“Post-Gadhafi Libya
now a jihadist springboard backed by Iran ,
Qatar , Sudan and Turkey
Map Libya
You can see
on the map that after Qaddafi fall Iran ,
Sudan , Qatar and Turkey
could use Libya and the armaments
of Qaddafi that they had managed to get hold of, in order to support rebel groups
in West Africa .
The national socialist French politician Marin Le Pen accused
I have
mentioned in the past the rebellion of the Tuareg warriors in Mali
Qaddafi
traditionally used the Tuaregs as mercenaries against his enemies.
Map Tuareg
Regions
When
Qaddafi fall the Tuaregs he were paying to fight on his side were left with his
advanced weaponry, and they aligned with their ex-enemy Al-Qaeda, in order to
create an Islamic state in Mali Iran and Sudan ,
and the Tuaregs, who were supported by Qaddafi in the past, in order to fight
the Malian government, who was supported by France
At the
following map you can see the ethnic groups of Mali Sahara . The largest ethnic
groups are the French allies.
Map Ethnic
Groups of Mali
At the following
map you can see with pink the areas that were controlled by the Tuaregs and Al-Qaeda
after the 2012 rebellion that followed the fall of Qaddafi.
Map The War
in Mali
The French
army intervened in Mali Mali the leader of the Sudanese Al-Qaeda, who
went to Mali Sudan killed in Mali
The French
saw in a completely different way the Tuaregs, who were an ex-Qaddafi ally, and
Al-Qaeda, who was supported by Iran
and Sudan France France
urges talks with Mali
Finally the
Tuaregs changed sides, and they started fighting Al-Qaeda. See Wikipedia “Northern Mali conflict: MNLA realigns with the Malian
Government”.
The Turkish
President Tayip Erdogan said that the French intervention in Mali was a crusade, and a few days ago, during a
speech in Niger , he said
that the French are colonialists, and Turkey
would never act like France Mali
After the
agreement for Iran Iran France
and Iran
Moreover Iran
Similar
agreements were made between Iran
and Italy Iran
As a result
the first visit of an Iranian President to France Iran will not support rebel groups against France in West Africa .
See “Iran and
France agree to cooperate to fight terrorism and resolve world crises”,
January 2016.
But Iran
said that to cooperate with France on terrorism France must realize that
fighting terrorism is equally important in Syria, and the question is not who
the president of Syria will be. Remember that France
is an Arab ally and France France
has a military base in the United Arab Emirates ,
and France
We have to
wait and see whether France
and Iran can cooperate in Syria and West Africa ,
and how this is going to affect the alliance between France and the Arabs.
Having said
so much about the war between France on one hand, and various terrorist groups
of Africa on the other, groups that were supported among others by Iran, Sudan
and Hezbollah, I have to say that the terrorist attacks in France had nothing
to do with Iran and Hezbollah.
These
attacks were orchestrated by the Islamic State. The Islamic State are the
ex-people of Saddam Hussein in Iraq
The oil and
natural gas of Iraq is
located in the Shia and Kurdish parts of the country, and the Sunnis are
fighting the Shia and the Kurds, and France
is very active in the oil fields and gas fields of Iraq ,
and France is fighting ISIS .
Therefore France is bombing ISIS, and ISIS supports
terrorist attacks in France Paris terror
attacks: ISIS bombed by France
Also see
Reuters “France to send
heavy weapons to Iraq –
Hollande”, July 2016, and CNN “French jets bomb ISIS stronghold of Raqqa , Syria
And when I
say that Iran or Sudan were supporting terrorist groups against France in Africa
it does not mean that they own these groups. The people of these groups are
criminals who can be hired by someone else. Now that Iran
has improved its relations with France
As far as Iran and France
are concerned, it remains to be seen how they will manage to sort out their
differences in Syria , and whether
the French will support the Trans-Saharan pipeline, which is good for France but very bad for Iran , Qatar ,
Russia and Turkey
Map
Possible Pipelines to Europe
Moreover we
must keep in mind that the relations between France
and Iran are better, but Turkey is still an enemy of France , and Turkey
was the country that was buying the oil of ISIS and was providing ISIS with intelligence.
That does
not mean that Turkey
supported the ISIS attacks in France Turkey
“Governmental
positions on the Iraq War prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq
“France
and Iran
1st,
2nd, 3rd , 4th Paragraphs
France and Iran have
signed 15 billion euros worth of business deals as President Rouhani continues
his European post-sanctions shopping trip.
The agreements cover
aviation, carmaking, energy, shipping, infrastructure, railways, health and
agriculture though most have not yet been finalised and French banks remain
wary of doing business with Iran. There is also an agreement between French
export-
credit group Coface
and the Iranian central bank.
Speaking at a
business forum hosted by France ’s
main industry body Medef, Carlos Tavares, the chief executive
of PSA Peugeot Citroen, detailed the planned modernisation of a
Peugeot car plant in Tehran
Iran says it wants
to buy over 100 Airbus planes to update its ageing fleet, including a dozen
A380 superjumbos. Exactly what stage the Airbus deal was at remained unclear on
Thursday, however, amid scepticism over how far and how fast western firms can
get into Iran
6th
Paragraph
Total has reportedly
signed a memorandum of understanding to purchase up to 200,000 barrels of
Iranian crude oil per day as the country moves to ramp up its exports to
pre-sanctions levels.
8th
Paragraph
French national
railway operator SNCF is to provide expertise for the building of
high speed rail lines and stations.
“French
Intervention in Mali
3rd,
4th Paragraphs
Ansar Dine, which
heads these groups in negotiations, withdrew an offer it had presented in Algeria that stipulated its cessation of
hostilities against Mali
Ansar Dine –
supported by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Jamaat at-Tawhid wal-Jihad
fi Gharb Afriqiya (The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa –
MOJWA), and al-Mulathamin (The Masked Ones, which split from al-Qaeda
under the leadership of Mokhtar Belmokhtar) froze negotiations by sending its
troops from Timbuktu towards the centre of Mali to attack the town of Mopti in
an attempt to convince the French and Malians that the Islamist militants had
resolved to move towards Bamako, thus forcing the French to make a hasty
decision to enter war.
3rd,
4th, 5th, 6th Paragraphs
Rouhani and his
French counterpart, François Hollande,
agreed to cooperate on the fight against terrorism and to work together to
resolve conflicts and crises the world over.
The trip came a
matter of weeks after a landmark accord was reached between Tehran
and six world powers to curb Iran
Hollande stressed
the need to rigourously apply the nuclear accord. Rouhani agreed, but said all
sides must meet their commitments.
“Italian companies sign deals worth €16-17 billion
with Iran
1st,
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th Paragraphs
What is the unseen
hand behind the rise of radical Islamic movements from Northern Nigeria to the Central African Republic Sudan Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement, North (SPLM North), which is
fighting the Sudanese government in the Nuba
Mountains and the Blue
Nile .
Speaking in London , Mr Arman pointed to the African Islamic University in
Khartoum
Mr Arman suggest
that Sudan’s aims are supported by a wider radical alliance, supported by
Qataris, Yemenis and the Iranians. “The Egyptians, Saudis and the Emirates are
very worried,” he says.
This circle of
Islamists – says Mr Arman – links a wide range of rebels across central and
northern Africa . These include Libyan rebels
now attempting to seize control of the country and movements in the Central African Republic Darfur .
Boko Haram
Mr Arman says
that Boko Haram is part of
this circle. He points to the large number of Nigerians – most of them
Fulani – who live in Sudan. “There
are as many millions of Nigerians in Sudan
“Turkey
Reinforces 'Hands Off' Policy on Mali
1st,
2nd Paragraphs
The Turkish foreign
ministry has criticized the ongoing French operation in Mali Turkey is increasingly
seeing West Africa as a region of interest
economically and diplomatically.
Ankara has been increasing voicing concerns
regarding the intervention by French forces against an Islamic insurgency in Mali
6th,
7th Paragragphs
The Turkish foreign
ministry points out the United Nations Security Council resolution on Mali
"I think this reflects some of the competition betweenTurkey and France Turkey Turkey Africa .
So its clear that Turkey
"I think this reflects some of the competition between
13th
Paragraph
Analysts say Ankara 's ambivalence over France Turkey 's pro
government media the question is increasingly being posed why those allies can
back an intervention in Mali
against an Islamic insurgency, but fail to do so in Syria
“Mali conflict: UN backs France
“Mali :
A Diplomatic Opportunity for Israel
2nd
Page
However, with the
electoral victory of Islamists in Egypt
and Tunisia , and with the
nearly takeover of Mali by
al-Qaeda, more and more African countries are becoming fearful of Iran Israel Nigeria
3rd
Page
Mali’s anger at Arab
countries, especially Egypt, is part of a wider African fear of Islamic
influence and of Iranian meddling on the continent. Even though France ’s military intervention in Mali is only meant to serve French interests, it
opens a window of opportunity which Israel
should seize to improve its relations with Africa and with France Mali ’s
Islamists are in stark contrast with France ’s
backing of the Muslim rebels in Côte
d’Ivoire France France
and Côte d’Ivoire France
support the Muslim rebels from Côte
d’Ivoire Israel , sought and obtained Israel France and Israel
ended up confronting each other by proxy in Côte d’Ivoire
While France and Israel
collided in Côte d’Ivoire ,
the policy of President François Hollande in Mali
creates a new community of interests, since France
is now fighting forces that are hostile to Israel Israel
to improve its relations with France
and with former French colonies in Africa .
This opportunity should be seized by Israel
“An unholy alliance”, June 2012
2nd,
3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th
Paragraphs
Machinegun bursts on
May 26th sent residents scurrying for cover. But the shooting turned out to be
celebratory. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, a secular
group known by its French initials, MNLA, had cut a deal with Islamic
fundamentalists from a locally dominant lot called Ansar Eddine. The pair
agreed to join forces and set up a transitional government. Peace would follow.
Yet residents still
have reason to be scared. Ansar Eddine has become almost indistinguishable from
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This
is the closest to government that al-Qaeda, under any guise, has ever come. Though
the nomadic Tuareg and other ethnic groups of northern Mali number only 1.3m people, the area they now
control is as big as France
The new alliance
seems to be founded on two pillars. Ansar Eddine, which had previously argued
only for autonomy, has evidently dropped its objections to full independence.
And the MNLA has agreed to an Islamic state. Many MNLA supporters are aghast at
what they see as a betrayal of a core principle of the decades-old Tuareg
rebellion: a secular state offering freedom of religion and lifestyle.
The deal may yet
fall apart. Tuareg officials say they want a model “similar to Mauritania or even Egypt
In the end a tribal
chief close to him had to put his name to it. The MNLA chose to deal with Ansar
Eddine because the fundamentalists have money and guns, whereas the MNLA can
barely afford to pay salaries. Flush with cash from al-Qaeda, Mr ag Ghali has
started to attract deserters from the impecunious Tuareg.
The government in Bamako , Mali France
“Sudan
Sudan has ordered
Iran to close its cultural centres and given their managers 72 hours to leave
the country, officials have said, as a diplomatic row threatens normally close
relations.
"Sudanese
authorities summoned the Iranian charge d'affaires in Khartoum and informed him
of the decision to close the three cultural centres and to give the diplomats
who ran them 72 hours to leave the country," the AFP news agency quoting
an unnamed official said on Tuesday.
Sudanese media
speculated that the expulsions were linked to government concerns that Iranian officials
were promoting their Shia brand of Islam in the largely Sunni country,
according to the Reuters news agency.
The Iranian cultural
centre and its branches had exceeded their mandates and "become a
threat to intellectual and social security," said a foreign ministry
statement.
Regional rivalries
Khartoum has
maintained generally close relations with Tehran, whose ships have made a
number of port calls in Port Sudan
Iran is also
reportedly a significant arms supplier to Sudan and the two governments are
both backers of Hamas, although Sudan
Sudan turned down an
Iranian offer to set up air defences on its Red Sea coast after a 2012 air
strike Khartoum blamed on Israel, fearing it would upset Tehran's regional
rival, the Sunni superpower Saudi Arabia, Sudan
A Sudanese analyst
told AFP that the move by Khartoum might be in
response to pressure from Riyadh
“Leader of Al-Qaeda in Sudan killed in Mali
The leader of Sudan ’s Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Niles group, Abu Hazim, was killed in an airstrike carried
out recently by French warplanes on the positions of jihadists in northern Mali
Hazim, whose real
name is Eman Mahmoud, was born in the northern Sudan
town of Dongola India
The SITE
Intelligence Group, a website that specialises in tracking the online activity
of terrorist organisations, was the first to reveal the news, saying it
obtained a statement announcing his death on Al- Qaeda-linked internet forums.
The Long War
Journal, another website dealing with terror groups, cited a US intelligence official saying that Hazim had
moved to Mali
The Sudanese
jihadist took part in operations in the Philippines
and Chechnya , as well as
joining the fight against the Soviet army in Afghanistan Iraq
and Somalia
Khartoum-based
newspaper Al-Sahafa said it obtained confirmation of his death from
“informed sources”. The daily further added that the latter denied the
existence of Al-Qaeda in Sudan
The Sudanese source
told Al-Sahafa they conducted a dialogue with these youth after their
return from Somalia
Last January, the
Sudanese Al-Qaeda group announced the formation of its student wing in the University of Khartoum
The Agence
France-Presse correspondent in the Malian capital, Bamako ,
last October reported that Islamist militants, including Sudanese, had been
pouring into northern Mali
A resident from Timbuktu
“Northern Mali conflict”
1st,
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th Paragraphs
The Northern
Mali Conflict , Mali
Civil War, or Mali
War refers to armed conflicts that started from January 2012 between the
northern and southern parts of Mali in Africa .
On 16 January 2012, several insurgent groups began fighting a campaignagainst
the Malian government for
independence or greater autonomy for northernMali,
an area known as Azawad. The National
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), an organization
fighting to make Azawad an independent homeland for the Tuareg people, had taken control of the region by
April 2012.
On 22 March 2012,
President Amadou Toumani Touré was
ousted in a coup d'étatover
his handling of the crisis, a month before a presidential
election was to have taken place.[112] Mutinous soldiers, calling themselves
the National Committee for
the Restoration of Democracy and State (CNRDR), took control
and suspended theconstitution of Mali.[113] As a consequence of the instability
following the coup, Mali's three largest northern cities—Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu—were overrun by the rebels[114] on three consecutive days.[115] On 5 April 2012, after the capture ofDouentza, the MNLA said that it had accomplished
its goals and called off its offensive. The following day, it proclaimed
Azawad's independence from Mali
The MNLA were
initially backed by the Islamist group Ansar Dine. After the Malian military was driven
from Azawad, Ansar Dine and a number of smaller Islamist groups began imposing
strict Sharia law. The MNLA and Islamists struggled to
reconcile their conflicting visions for an intended new state.[117] Afterwards, the MNLA began fighting
against Ansar Dine and other Islamist groups, includingMovement
for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA/MUJAO), a splinter
group of Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb. By 17 July 2012, the MNLA had lost control of most
of northern Mali
The government of Mali
A peace deal between
the government and Tuareg rebels was signed on 18 June 2013[61] but on 26 September 2013 the rebels
pulled out of the peace agreement and claimed that the government had not
respected its commitments to the truce.[120] Fighting is still ongoing even though
French forces are scheduled for withdrawal.[121] A ceasefire agreement was signed on
February 19, 2015 in Algiers,Algeria but sporadic terrorist attacks still
occur.[122]
“Northern Mali
conflict: MNLA realigns with the Malian Government”
1st,
2nd Paragraphs
By December, the now
displaced MNLA began peace talks with the Malian government and relinquished
its previous goal of Azawadi independence in favor of a request for self-rule
within Mali
After the
declaration, the MNLA re-engaged the Islamist forces, and, with the help of one
defecting Islamist faction, retook the cities of Tessalit and Kidal (the site
of earlier pro-MNLA protests against the Islamists[173]) in late January.[195][196]
“Mali
5th Paragraph
The five main
Islamists groups in Mali are
Ansar Dine, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Mujao), al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the
Signed-in-Blood Battalion and the Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA).
“In Mali
fight, Chad proves a
powerful partner for France
1st ,
2nd Paragraphs
Weeks after the
French launched their military intervention in Mali, the majority of Islamist rebels who were once
in control of northern Mali
But forces
from Chad have followed
them, spearheading an ambitious push into northern Mali ’s
Ifoghas mountains, a terrain often compared toAfghanistan’s Tora Bora. And despite suffering dozens of
casualties during weeks of heavy combat, Chadian forces have succeeded in
killing and capturing more than 100 jihadist militants and uprooting a network
of weapons caches, fuel depots, and food stuffs hidden among the countless
caves and grottoes that dot the landscape.
7th
Paragraph
The Chadians have
proved to be a useful partner not only because of their decades of experience
fighting in a similar climate and terrain, but because they have spent much of
the past decade fighting a panoply of rebel groups in their own country, many
of which preferred to operate as light and mobile units, using tactics similar
to those currently employed by the jihadis in Mali
“France
to end Central African
Republic
1st Paragraph
France will end its
military intervention in the Central African Republic this year as it has
achieved its objectives of restoring security to the country after three years
of communal violence, the French defence minister said Wednesday.
3rd,
4th Paragraphs
At the time,
"the country was in the throes of civil war, torn by religious tensions,
plagued by chaos, on the brink of pre-genocidal scenarios," Le Drian said.
"In the space of two years, the Sangaris force restored calm and prevented
the unacceptable.
6th
Paragraph
The CAR plunged into
chaos in March 2013 when mostly Muslim Seleka rebels ousted President Francois
Bozize, a Christian, and installed their leader Michel Djotodia in power for 10
months.
“Sudan : Leader of Al-Qaeda in Sudan Killed in Mali
The leader of
Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Niles , Sudan , Abu Hazim was killed in an airstrike
carried out recently by French warplanes on the positions jihadists in northern
Mali
Abu Hazim, whose
real name is Eman Mahmoud, was born in the northern Sudan
town of Dongola India
“Is Qatar
fuelling the crisis in north Mali
1st ,
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th Paragraph
Oil-rich gulf state Qatar has a vested interest in the outcome of
the north Mali crisis,
according to various reports that have been picked up by French MPs, amid
suspicion that Doha
Since Islamist
groups exploited a military coup in the Malian capital of Bamako in early 2012
to take control of the entire north of the country, accusations of Qatari
involvement in a crisis that has seen France deploy troops have
been growing.
Last week two French
politicians explicitly accused Qatar
of giving material support to separatists and Islamists in north Mali , adding fuel to speculation that the
Emirate is playing a behind-the-scenes role in spreading Islamic fundamentalism
in Africa .
French far-right
leader Marine Le Pen and Communist Party Senator Michelle Demessine both said
that that Qatar
“If Qatar is
objecting to France’s engagement in Mali it’s because intervention risks
destroying Doha’s most fundamentalist allies,” Le Pen said in a statement on her party
website, in response to a call by Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad
bin Jassim al-Thani for dialogue with the Islamists.
“France
urges talks with Mali
French Foreign
Minister Alain Juppe said on Thursday there could only be a resolution to the
Tuareg-led rebellion in the north of Mali
For long one of the
most stable democracies in West Africa ,
Mali
"There will not
be a military solution with the Tuaregs. There needs to be a political
solution," Juppe said, adding that countries in the region had to begin
talks to accomplish this.
The rebels, battling
alongside Islamist militants who want to impose sharia, or Islamic law, swept
through northern Mali last week, pushing government forces from Kidal, Gao and
Timbuktu, the three northern regions of Mali that the MNLA says will form the
new state.
Juppe said Paris was
in contact with the various players in Mali, including the MNLA, which he said
was a credible interlocutor. He said there was clear distinction between that
group which was seeking independence and the Ansar Dine Islamists, who had been
"infiltrated" by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb .
"They have
another objective which is to establish an Islamist regime in Mali and the Sahel
as a whole," Juppe said. "I don't see how we could have dialogue with
AQIM whose objective is to kill our citizens."
“UAE agrees
to French base by 2009”, January 2008
1st ,
2nd , 3rd Paragraphs
A defense agreement inked during the visit to
"The base will be permanent. It will be the first such French base in the Gulf and it will face the
“Ankara 's Failure: How Turkey
1st
Paragraph
When anti-government protests spread from Tunisia to Egypt, Libya,
and Syriafive years ago, optimists declared that the
Middle East was on the precipice of a dramatic democratic transformation. Among
the most optimistic were the leaders of Turkey,
who saw the upheaval as an opportunity to realize their neo-Ottoman dream of
positioning Turkey Libya
and Syria are caught in
civil wars, Egypt grows
increasingly authoritarian, and Tunisia Ankara
3rd
Paragraph
The Arab Spring, as
they saw it, provided a golden opportunity to realize this dream. As early as
September 2011, Erdogan toured Libya
and Egypt
5th,
6th, 7th Paragraph
Erdogan’s strategy
was not as advertised. Far from championing pluralism and protection of civil
liberties in the region, Erdogan opted to champion the chauvinistic style of
political Islam primarily associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. With its
own roots associated with the movement, it was a natural evolution for the AKP.
Indeed, Erdogan had already built closer ties with many of the regional Muslim
Brotherhood movements over the years, perhaps best exemplified by his close and
personal relationship the leadership of the
Palestinian terrorist group Hamas, itself a splinter of the Brotherhood. Ankara
also teamed up with Qatar, a longtime sponsor of Brotherhood movements
region-wide that is viewed by many of its Gulf Arab neighbors as
dangerously provocative in this regard.
The AKP’s support
for the Brotherhood was clear in Tunisia
and Libya , but was arguably
most evident in Egypt Israel Egypt ,
Ankara quickly committedto helping strengthen Egypt Turkey ’s
economic support, pledgingnearly $2 billion in aid to the new
government in Cairo Ankara
Ankara’s assistance
to the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria was more covert than in Egypt, but no less
significant. The Baathist Syrian regime had banned the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities in
the 1960s and exiled the group in 1982. Even before the
uprising against President Bashar al Assad erupted in 2011, the AKP pushed for
a Damascus–Brotherhood reconciliation. But its real support to the organization
came after the revolution began. Although the Brotherhood was largely
irrelevant to the Syrian revolution in its early stages, Ankara
propelled the group to the top echelons of nearly all the opposition groups that organized in Turkey
“France : Why intervene in Mali and not Central African Republic
1st,
2nd, 3rd Paragraphs
When France received
requests from two of its former African colonies to intervene in their domestic
conflicts these past couple of months, its replies could not have been more
different.
Mali's calls were
answered with a swift and affirmative response, and France found itself
intervening in Africa once again, having been involved in conflicts in Libya and the Ivory Coast
By contrast, when
President François Bozizé of the Central African
Republic (CAR)petitioned the country's former colonial ruler for assistance in
fighting rebels, his calls were firmly rejected despite the fact the insurgency
was gaining significant ground and looked like it could threaten the capital Bangui
“Gaddafi's
influence in Mali
2nd
Paragraph
The trouble began
when hundreds of Malian combatants who had fought to defend the late Libyan
leader, Muammar Gaddafi, fled back home with weapons at the end of last year
and formed the most powerful Tuareg-led rebel group the region has known - the
Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA).
“Qaddafi’s
Weapons, Taken by Old Allies, Reinvigorate an Insurgent Army inMali”, February 2012
2nd,
3rd Paragraphs
Hundreds of Tuareg
rebels, heavily armed courtesy of Colonel Qaddafi’s extensive arsenal, have
stormed towns in Mali’s northern desert in recent weeks, in one of the most
significant regional shock waves to emanate directly from the colonel’s fall.
After fighting for
Colonel Qaddafi as he struggled to stay in power, the Tuaregs helped themselves
to a considerable quantity of sophisticated weaponry before returning to Mali
19th,
20th Paragraphs
In some ways, the
aggressive new Tuareg campaign represents the kind of support the rebels had
long sought from Colonel Qaddafi, who for years alternately aided and betrayed
the desert warriors, according to a recent study by Mr. Boilley. After the
great regional droughts of the 1970s and 1980s, young Tuaregs migrated north to
the colonel’s military training camps, to later fight for him in places
like Chad, while at the same time destabilizing the governments
in Niger and Mali.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/06/world/africa/tuaregs-use-qaddafis-arms-for-rebellion-in-mali.html?
“Nuclear
Power in France
65th
Paragraph
“Sudan : 'Al Bashir Copying and Pasting Darfur
Genocide Into Blue Nile ' - Yasir Arman”, June
2016
“Chad
1st Paragraph
* Production at
130,000 bpd by end-2014, 260,000 bpd by 2016
* Firms assessing
mineral deposits including gold, nickel
* Economic growth
between 11 pct-13 pct in 2014
* Chad
“Central African Republic (CAR): Violence linked
to Sudan and Iran
“Nigeria ’s Khomeini, Spreading Iran’s Revolution
to Africa ”, December 2015
IRANIAN
SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM
Al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
“Chad ’s relations with Libya ,
Sudan , France and the US
After the
Arab Spring: Algeria
“Al Qaeda
in North Africa ”
“Chad
“Libya , Chad
and Sudan
“France Prepares for War in the Central African Republic
“Nigeria
5th Paragraph
In the past Boko
Haram is thought to have had links with al-Qaeda.
“Bin
Laden's $20m African 'blood diamond' deals”, October 2002
1st ,
2nd , 3rd Paragraphs
The terrorist
network led by Osama bin Laden struck deals in 'blood diamonds' worth over $20
million in the months before the attacks of 11 September 2001.
Ahead of London 's $500-per-ticket, diamond-trade gala dinner next
month, when Nelson Mandela is to congratulate the trade on its efforts to
eradicate smuggling, The Observer can reveal the true size of the cash
stockpile al-Qaeda has made from the stones mined illegally by Revolutionary
United Front rebels in Sierra
Leone
'Given that the
attacks on America cost only about $500,000, it is terrifying that al-Qaeda
managed to convert $20m of its cash into diamonds,' said Alex Yearsley of
Global Witness, which campaigns against the 'blood diamonds' trade.
'The ease with which
terrorist organisations can use diamonds as a source of funding and money
laundering is frightening; they can easily transport them over borders without
detection and convert them back into banknotes whenever they need the money.'
“The Long
History of French Military Intervention in the Middle East and Africa ”, November 2015
“Kenya woos S. Sudan after oil pipeline deal with
Uganda
1st ,
2nd Paragraphs
The move comes after
the collapse of the Uganda Kenya
could find itself in a difficult situation again saying Total, which killed the
Uganda deal, is the main
holder of the majority of oil blocks in South Sudan .
“South Sudan
to split Total oil block”, September 2012
1st ,
2nd , 3rd Paragraphs
South Sudan will
split a massive oil block largely held by Total into three parts, giving one to
the French company and the others to two firms, officials said, in the biggest
shake-up of the nation's concessions since it seceded from Sudan
One oil industry
source identified the other two operators as U.S.
major Exxon Mobil and Kuwait
Total, Exxon Mobil
and Kuwait Petroleum Corp, the state-owned parent firm of Kufpec, all declined
to comment on the division of the mostly unexplored block, known as Block B.
6th
Paragraph
French firm Total is
behind Uganda ’s involvement
with Tanzania Congo , Uganda
and South Sudan, and would be interested in having all its resources together
transported through the Port
of Tanga
“Chad
Chad has more than
200 distinct ethnic groups,[57] which create diverse social structures.
The colonial administration and independent governments have attempted to
impose a national society, but for most Chadians the local or regional society
remains the most important influence outside the immediate family.
Nevertheless, Chad
“Iran and Hamas back Sudan
“Egypt 's
Brotherhood backs Hizbullah in spat with Cairo
1st Paragraph
The Muslim
Brotherhood, Egypt's largest opposition group, has pledged its support for
Hizbullah as a much publicized spat between the Lebanese group and the Cairo government
deepened this week. In a statement released late on Wednesday, the Brotherhood
said that Hizbullah's admission of using Egypt
as a base to facilitate weapons shipments to Hamas in the Gaza
4th
Paragraph
Authorities in Cairo arrested 49 men accused of working on behalf of
Hizbullah to plot attacks against Egyptian institutions and Israeli tourists in
the Sinai region of Egypt
“Iranian
president does big business in Europe ”, January
2016
1st , 2nd, 3rd, 4th,
5th, 6th Paragraphs
The first visit by
an Iranian leader to Europe in more than a
decade has begun with a flurry of business deals.
Hassan Rouhani
landed in Italy on Monday
and within hours was striking agreements worth billions of dollars to modernize
Iran
Saipem (SAPMY) was one of the first companies out of
the gate, signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the Parsian Oil & Gas
Development Company.
Saipem said the
agreement covered "potential cooperation in revamping and upgrading the
Pars Shiraz and Tabriz
Danieli (DNIYY) said it signed agreements worth 5.7
billion euros ($6 billion) to supply heavy machinery and equipment to Iran
These deals are
among the 14 contracts, MOUs and cooperation agreements signed in Rome on Monday, according to Iran
Further deals worth
more than $18 billion were expected on Tuesday, IRNA reported.
13th,
14th Paragraphs
Similar deals are
expected to be unveiled in Paris
A deal for Iran to buy more than 100 aircraft
from Airbus (EADSF) is widely expected to be signed in Paris
“Turkey
attacks France on Libya
1st ,
2nd, 3rd Paragraphs
The Turkish
government on Thursday lashed out at France
over its approach to military intervention in Libya
Ahmet Davutoglu,
foreign minister, also said it would be “impossible for us to share
responsibility in an operation some authorities have described as a crusade” –
a reference to the gaffe made earlier this week by Claude Guéant, French
interior minister.
Reçep Tayyip
Erdogan, prime minister, cast doubt on the motives for the French-led
intervention, telling a conference: “I advise our western friends, when they
look at this region, to see the hungry children, the suffering mothers, the
poverty . . . I wish they would not only see oil, gold mines or underground
wealth.”
5th,
6th, 7th Paragraphs
Turkey’s insistence
that Nato should have sole control of all military operations in Libya reflects
the deep distrust and antipathy felt in Ankara towards Nicolas Sarkozy, the
French president.
Mr Sarkozy, who has
long flaunted his opposition to Turkey’s efforts to join the EU, was openly
slighted by his hosts when he visited Ankara last month and was pilloried in
the press, with photographs staged to highlight his short stature.
Turkish ministers
and officials were infuriated at being excluded from Saturday’s summit in Paris
“Rebellion
and fragmentation in northern Mali
“Algeria
1st,
2nd, 3rd Paragraphs
When Arab League
foreign ministers voted by a majority earlier this month to declare Hezbollah a
“terrorist organisation,” Algeria
stood with Lebanon , Iraq and Syria
According to an
adviser to Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the country’s refusal to
side with Saudi Arabia
13th
Paragraph
Algeria had already refused to participate in international
coalitions in Syria and in Yemen with Saudi Arabia and some
other Arab League states because of the principle of non-interference, he said.
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/algeria-risks-isolation-arab-league-over-hezbollah-stance-1870366475
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/algeria-risks-isolation-arab-league-over-hezbollah-stance-1870366475
“Why did Iran , Morocco
“Sudan 's President Omer al Bashir’s New Best
Friend - Russia
3rd, 4th
, 5th , 6th , 7th , 8th Paragraphs
But now Moscow
Al Bashir has a
rather unusual international condition – he is the third sitting head of state
indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the first to be charged
with genocide. On 12 July 2010, after a lengthy appeal by the prosecution, the
ICC determined that there was sufficient evidence for charges of genocide to be
brought and issued a warrant for his arrest containing three separate counts
due to his government’s murderous rampages in Darfur .
But a number of
countries have simply ignored the warrant, and al Bashir has made state visits
to both Turkey and China
The Russian Federation ’s Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Mikhail Bogdanov, traveled with a delegation to the Sudanese capital, Khartoum Sudan to
convene the first "Russian Sudanese Joint Working Group," formed
after Sudanese Foreign Affairs minister Ali Karti's visit to Moscow
Following a meeting
with al Bashir on 1 February, who encouraged the "Russian Sudanese Joint
Working Group" meeting to put before them "the priorities and joint
schemes which will help in enhancing the two countries' relations,"
Bogdanov returned to Moscow and told reporters that the Russian government
intends to support Sudan in order to find durable solutions to all of its
outstanding issues with South Sudan, saying, "President Omar al Bashir
discussed very important issues and he briefed us on the outcomes of the recent
African Union summit, and the differences between Sudan and South Sudan."
And oh, Bogdanov
also added that his meeting with al Bashir touched on economic relations and
Russian investments in the Sudan
“Algerian Foreign Policy in the Context of the
Arab Spring”, January 2013
5th ,
6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th,
11th Paragraphs
Since it gained
independence in 1962, Algeria promoted an international architecture that
defended the sovereignty of states and the right to decolonization.[2] It
became a strong voice of African and Arab revolutionaries and a leading
proponent of the rights of the developing world, rejecting the Cold War rigid
bipolar structure and mobilizing support in multilateral forums for its agenda
of self-determination, inviolability of borders, non-interference in domestic
affairs and sovereign equality.[3] In a well-received speech before the UN
General Assembly in April 1974, Algerian guerrilla-turned-statesman Houari
Boumedienne called for the creation of a new world order where the rights of
the underprivileged are protected. The old order, he said, consecrated the
impoverishment of the Third World and
perpetuated global inequalities.
Boumedienne’s
ambitions to build international support for his vision of a cooperative,
equitable and just world order soon hit a roadblock. The eruption of the
Western Sahara conflict in late 1975 set Algeria against Morocco, dividing the
global south into supporters and detractors of Algeria’s foreign policy.[4] In
Africa, the conflict exposed the continent’s deep political, economic and
ideological cleavages between the moderate countries aligned with Morocco and
the so-called progressives backing Algeria. Morocco’s withdrawal from the
Organization of African States (OAU) in 1984 in response to the OAU admission
of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in 1982 intensified this divide
and dampened any hope of African unity and solidarity.[5] By making the
military and diplomatic support for the Polisario rebels a central pillar of
its foreign policy, Algeria’s grand strategic preferences and initiatives to
promote them came to be seen through the prism of this conflict. It became
“very hard to defend the idea of a new international order when you are engaged
in a cold war with your neighbor,” wrote Algerian scholar Akram Belkaid.[6] The
death of Boumedienne in 1978 did not end the stand-off between North Africa’s
major two rivals, but it reduced Algeria’s ambitions to build a single-voiced
powerful bloc capable of fighting for the creation of an international
egalitarian political and economic order.
Under the presidency
of Chadli Bendjedid from 1979-1992, Algeria’s foreign policy continued to be
based on the same ideological principles of self-determination, freedom from
external control, and its own special brand of socialism, but several factors
contributed to an attenuated commitment to revolutionary idealism in its
international relations. The end of the colonial era in Africa, the resistance
of the industrialized West to the economic reforms defended by Algeria and the
inherent instability of its own economic model led to a shift in the country’s
foreign policy orientation.[7] The economic and political constraints that
Algeria began to face in the mid-1980s accelerated the country’s diminished
global aspirations and refocused its diplomacy on its immediate neighborhood.[8]
The collapse of the
Soviet Union in 1991 and the descent of Algeria
The primary
objective of Algerian foreign policy in the 1990s was to prevent the isolation
of the country and any outside interference in its own internal conflict.[10]
The military regime sought international acquiescence for its decision in
January 1992 to abort the electoral process and rob the Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS) of victory in the second round of parliamentary elections. More
importantly, it fought to prevent the international community from focusing on
the excesses of the struggle against armed Islamist groups. The foreign policy
machinery was geared toward convincing the West and the Arab world that there
was only a military solution to Algeria
The election of the
former foreign minister of Houari Boumedienne, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, to the
presidency in April 1999 reinvigorated Algerian foreign policy. Bouteflika was
determined to restore Algeria United States strengthened Algeria Algeria Algeria ’s southern hinterland boosted
Bouteflika’s push to make Algeria
Bouteflika brought a
dose of pragmatism to Algeria’s foreign policy, skillfully engineering a
strategic rapprochement with the United States and expanding defense and
economic trade beyond the country’s old partners. Algeria Algeria ’s perception of self-determination
remains unchanged, as is demonstrated by its continuing refusal to compromise
on the Western Sahara dispute. Despite the
indifference of the Algerian public to this conflict,[14] the growing number of
countries that have severed their relations with the Polisario,[15] and the
support of most Arab states and the major world powers for a consensual
political solution, Algeria hopes for a referendum that leads to the
independence of the Western Sahara similar to East Timor. Algerian diplomacy is
still driven by the same objectives that guided its approach to the conflict
since its eruption in late 1975: using every diplomatic tool to drum up support
for the Polisario as the only legitimate interlocutor of the Sahrawi tribes and
delegitimize Morocco internationally by holding it solely responsible for the
stalemate.[16]
“Qatar
moving closer to Algeria
3rd ,
4th, 5th, 6th Paragraphs
The two
'brother' states have a long-standing yet ambivalent relationship. The Emir Hamad is
known to have long admired the Algerian struggle for
their liberation, as well as the country’s diplomatic
ambitions on the international scene in the 1960s and
1970s. Moreover, Qatar has long been considered one of
Algeria’s main Arab allies, and before the Arab
Spring the Damascus-Doha-Algiers
alliance was a powerful counterweight to
the Riyadh-Cairo axis.Moreover, within the Arab
League, Algeria and Qatar often found themselvessimilarly placed
on major issues such as Palestine. Economic relations between
the two countries are also good, and the emirate is home to
a wide diaspora of Algerians who work in many sectors. In
addition, the current head of the Algerian
State , Abdelaziz Bouteflika, knows the
Gulf States Algeria and Qatar
However, Algeria is wary of Gulf
monarchies as it considers them too closely aligned with Morocco to be trusted, especially after
the invitation made by theGulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to
Morocco and Jordan Algiers found the coverage of the parliamentary
election of May 2012 to also be very negative(nevertheless, Al-Jazeera is widely
watched in Algeria
The new
context in place since 2011 in North Africa and the
Sahel following theoutbreak of the Arab Spring has
created difficult situations for the Algerian regime, and Qatar Doha Algeria Algiers Algiers feared that regional
balances would change greatlywith this intervention, which was subsequently
confirmed, particularly in the Sahel .
Finally, Algeria Libya was thus
seen as undesirable by Algiers Algeria
waited several months before recognizing the National Transitional
Council,while Qatar
In
addition, the emirate also played an important role in the
events in Syria , the
former ally of Algeria Tunisia Algiers Algiers is
concernedabout the growing role of Qatar Doha Qatar in
January 2013 suggests that Algiers wants the peninsula to refocus
itsrelationship with Algeria
“Rohani
hails ‘new chapter’ in Iran-France relations”, January 2016
1st
Paragraph
Iranian
President Hassan
Rouhani has rounded off a four-day European tour in Paris – the the first visit toFrance by an
Iranian president in 17 years.
“The
Iranian-Saudi Proxy Wars Come to Mali”, August 2015
9th Paragraph
Iran and Mali have a
warm, if limited, relationship. When Iran ’s
then-president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, visited Bamako and Timbuktu Mustafa International School ’s
director, Mohamed Diabaté, who studied in Iran school
of Sufism common across West Africa has roots in Shiite, rather than Sunni,
teaching.)
17th
Paragraph
“Tehran
switches gear in its relationship with Tripoli
“Profile: Central African Republic
14th,
15th, 16th Paragraphs
Mr Djotodia also
worked in CAR's foreign ministry and was named consul to Nyala in neighbouring Sudan 's Darfur
region.
He was said to have
used his time there to cultivate alliances with Sudanese militias and Chadian
rebels in the area.
"It was these
fighters from the Chad/Sudan/CAR borderlands who became the military backbone
of the Seleka rebel coalition... The UFDR fighters I knew - tough guys, but a
bit ragtag, especially compared to their counterparts in places like Chad or
Sudan - could have put up a decent fight against the CAR armed forces on their
own, but the 'Chadians' were what made them so unstoppable," Ms Lombard
says.
“Mystery Shrouds Rise and Aims of Rebel at
Helm of Central African
Republic
9th Paragraph
Mr. Djotodia hails
from Vakaga Prefecture, in the forested savanna of the country’s northeast, an
isolated region at the borders with Chad
and Sudan where the Central African Republic
14th
Paragraph
Mr. Djotodia is said
to have spent a decade studying in the Soviet Union, beginning in the 1970s; he
married and had two daughters there before returning with fluent Russian, Dr.
Lombard said. He also speaks French and Sango, the country’s official
languages, and Gula, his ethnic language.
16th
Paragraph
Having cultivated a
relationship with Jean-Francis Bozizé, whose father, François, seized power in a 2003 coup,
Mr. Djotodia was appointed as the Central African consul in Nyala, the capital
of South Darfur
State in Sudan
24th
Paragraph
He emerged from
relative silence at the end of last year, when he helped to construct the rebel
coalition that drove Mr. Bozizé from power. Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries
were critical to the rebels’ success, and their presence can most likely be
credited to Mr. Djotodia, analysts say.
“Muslim nations accuse Iran
Leaders from more
than 50 Muslim nations accused Iran on Friday of supporting terrorism and interfering
in the affairs of regional states, including Syria and Yemen, a condemnation
that may widen the divide between Iran and its main rival, Saudi Arabia.
The leaders,
including Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, have been attending a summit in Istanbul this week of the 57-member Organisation of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to discuss a such issues as the humanitarian fall-out
from Syria
"The conference
deplored Iran 's interference
in the internal affairs of the States of the region and other member states
including Bahrain , Yemen , Syria ,
and Somalia
“Nigeria
to question Iranian over arms seized in Lagos
2nd,
3rd, 4th Paragraphs
But security sources
say Iran
10th,
11th, 12th Paragraphs
Nigeria's
authorities have described discovering an arsenal in Lagos two weeks ago, which
included rocket launchers, grenades and mortars.
Mr Ajumogobia told
reporters that investigations had shown that the weapons did indeed come from Iran
"That's been
confirmed from our own shipping documents and the Iranian foreign
minister," he said.
19th
Paragraph
It says the shipment
came from Bandar Abbas, a port in southern Iran
“Iran
denies shipping arms to Islamist militants in Somalia
4th Paragraph
"The
allegations of arm transfers from Iran
to Somalia are absurd
fabrications and have no basis or validity," Iran Republic of Iran
“Gambia cuts ties with Iran
1st ,
2nd ,3rd, 4th Paragraphs
The Gambia has said it is cutting all ties with Iran
Officials from the
small West African nation gave no reason for the move.
But last month Nigeria said it had intercepted an illegal arms
shipment in Lagos from Iran , destined for The Gambia
Senior Iranian
official Alaeddin Borujerdi has said the move was taken under US
“Senegal
severs ties with Iran
1st ,
2nd, 3rd Paragraphs
Senegal has cut
diplomatic ties with Iran, accusing Tehran of supplying weapons to separatist
rebels in its southern Casamance region, the foreign ministry said.
"Senegal has decided to break off diplomatic relations with the Republic of Iran," the foreign ministry said in a statement on Wednesday.
The statement linked the Iranian weapons with an attack on Sunday in Casamance, the latest in a string of such attacks by rebels engaged in one ofAfrica 's longest-running conflicts, which resulted in the
deaths of three Senegalese troops.
"Senegal has decided to break off diplomatic relations with the Republic of Iran," the foreign ministry said in a statement on Wednesday.
The statement linked the Iranian weapons with an attack on Sunday in Casamance, the latest in a string of such attacks by rebels engaged in one of
“Kenyan government links 2 terrorism suspects
to Iran
1st
, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Paragraphs
Kenyan security
agencies announced Saturday the arrest of two terrorism suspects with alleged
links to Iran, claiming that both men admitted plotting attacks on Western
targets in the African nation.
Abubakar Sadiq Louw,
69, and Yassin Sambai Juma, 25, are accused of terrorism and espionage on
behalf of Iranian state intelligence. The pair "admitted to conspiring to
mount terror attacks," with the government asserting that the men's
targets "included hotels in Nairobi
Described as a
senior figure in the Shiite Muslim community in the capital of Nairobi, Louw
was working on behalf of the Quds Force, an elite unit of Iran's Revolutionary
Guard that has carried out covert operations in other countries, the agencies
said. Juma was allegedly one of the students Louw recruited.
There was no
immediate comment from the Iranian government.
8th,
9th Paragraphs
In 2012, two Iranians were arrested and charged with
preparation to commit a felony and possession of explosives without a license.
A senior Kenyan government official familiar with the intelligence in that case
said the men were in the advanced stages of planning a terrorist attack.
"We don't allow
organizations or countries to commit terror in our country," the official
said, adding that the suspects may have wanted to use Kenya
“UN investigates Nigerian weapons shipment
from Iran
1st,
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th Paragraphs
UN weapons experts
are in Nigeria to inspect an
Iranian arms shipment seized in the port of Lagos
The weapons,
including rocket launchers and grenades, were found in containers labelled as
building materials.
8th,
9th Paragraphs
But the shipment was
intercepted when an attempt was made to re-export it to The Gambia
The Gambia 's neighbour Senegal
recalled its ambassador to Tehran
“Alberto Nisman: Argentina
1st,
2nd, 3rd Paragraphs
A year after the mysterious death of star
prosecutor Alberto Nisman shookArgentina to
the core and made headlines around the world, the case may finally be moving
closer to a solution.
A judicial attempt
to rule out the suggestion that Nisman’s death was suicide and the appearance
in court of a former spymaster who could provide clues in the case suggests
that the stalled investigation may inching towards a conclusion.
Nisman was found
shot dead in his home last year just hours before he was due to appear before
Congress to explain his accusations that thenpresident Cristina Fernández de
Kirchner had conspired to cover up Iran’s alleged involvement in a 1994 terrorist attack in
Buenos Aires.
“Iran-Linked Terror Suspect’s Family Faults
SSS”,
1st,
2nd Paragraphs
The family urged the
SSS to charge Abdullahi to court or release him. Abdullahi, a leader of Shi’a
Islamic sect and two other terror suspects, Sulaiman Saka and Saheed Adewunmi,
were paraded by the SSS penultimate Wednesday for allegedly working for Iranian
terrorists planning to attack American and Israeli interests in Nigeria. Deputy
Director, Public Relations, SSS, Marilyn Ogar, also alleged that Abdullahi
confessed to interrogators that he received $4,000 upon completion of his
training in Iran; 3,500 Euro in April 2012 at a meeting in Dubai. Ogar further
said that Abdullahi received $20,000, out of which he allegedly used $10,000 in
relocating to Lagos from Ilorin
“Iran and Sudan
Begin to Execute Moves to Dominate Central & Western
Africa ”, July 2013
35th,
36th, 37th, 38th, 39th Paragraphs
Meanwhile, hectic
preparations were, by late June 2013, taking place in Khartoum
for the escalation of the surge into western Africa .
Both Iran and Sudan consider the Central
African Republic (CAR) a crucial venue because the CAR
permits movement westward around the chaos in Darfur
and the French presence in N’Djamena. Moreover, Bangui
provides quick access to the Gulf of Guinea , as well as to the sub-Sahelian east-west
roadway which passes through the region’s main capitals — those which Khartoum has been recently courting — all the way to Dakar
On June 17, 2013,
Pres. Omar al-Bashir of Sudan
and President Michel Djotodia of the Central
African Republic oversaw in Khartoum
a series of secret multi-national discussions which would now facilitate a
dramatic break-out westward for Sudan ,
Iran
Djotodia is the
first Muslim to lead the CAR, significant since only 15 percent of the
population is Muslim and most of them practice tribally-influenced offshoots of
Islam. Djotodia, in contrast, was a councilor in the CAR Embassy in Sudan but based in Darfur
where he was converted to Islamism-jihadism by his Sudanese hosts. He is
convinced in the Sudanese tenet that a strong jihadist kernel is indispensable
to ensuring the loyalty and cohesion of any revolutionary movement irrespective
of its openly declared ideology or policy.
Indeed, the key
internal security and intelligence positions in Djotodia’s Seleka coalition are
held by fellow jihadists and their own stalwart tribal-jihadist militias.
Hence, Djotodia is convinced he is beholden to Bashir’s Sudan
“Africa: Iran
3rd Paragraph
Iran’s Africa
strategy involves courting African countries voting in important international
bodies, prioritizing outreach to African countries that mine uranium, and
cementing partnerships that could give Iran
12th
Paragraph
Iranian diplomats
have long sought to cultivate ties with South Africa South Africa Tehran ,
however, trade is not the only factor in Iran ’s
desire to have good relations with South Africa
21st,
22nd Paragraphs
Another factor
behind Iran Iran back to Africa .
A number of African
states mine uranium: Nambia and Niger Malawi
and Gabon Togo , Guinea , the Central
African Republic , the Democratic
Republic of the Congo , Uganda ,
and Zimbabwe.[31] Iran
“Zimbabwe
and Algeria sending troops
to support Gaddafi in Libya
3rd
Paragraph
While in February
the media focused on the rebels and allegations from Gaddafi's former Chief of
Protocol Nouri Al Misrahia that the leader was using mercenaries from Kenya,
Chad, Niger and Mali against his own people after losing control of the Libyan
army, other reports suggested that while the mercenaries might have represented
a very small part of Gaddafi's forces, the governments of Algeria, Zimbabwe and
even South Africa were actively helping the leader
5th
Paragraph
It would not be the
first time that Mugabe sent Zimbabwean militia's without prior consultation as
in 1997 the country's troops were sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC) to help Laurent Kabila against rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Zimbabwe is also tipped as the favourite exile
destination if Gaddafi ever decides to leave the country as President Robert
Mugabe is the Libyan leader's closest ally in Africa .
Over the years Gaddafi was said to have showered his counterpart with donations
and subsidised oil shipments and in late 2010, Mugabe's party Zanu PF received
hundreds of tractors and much farming equipment from Libya
9th
Paragraph
At the same time
reports also surfaced about Algeria
11th
Paragraph
Algeria Watch also
accused the Algerian government of having provided the air transport planes
that have carried sub-Saharan African mercenaries from Niger, Chad and Darfur to Libya
“The Algerian
Connection”, September 2011
2nd ,
3rd, 4th Paragraphs
Algeria and the
Gaddafi regime have had a common enemy: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
made up largely of former members of the Algerian terrorist movement, the
Islamic Armed Group (GIA). The Algerian Government suppressed this group, which
rose up following the Government’s cancellation in 1992 of an election that
would have led to the victory of the Islamist political party, the Islamic
Salvation Front (FIS). The 10-year war that followed ended in a defeat of the
GIA and at an appalling cost of lives on both sides. The GIA then became the
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and later officially joined al Qaeda.
AQIM has retreated to the Sahel area south of the Saharan desert, where it is
now mainly engaged in kidnapping Europeans (mostly French) and demanding
ransom. However, in the most spectacular attack in years, terrorists stormed
the Military Academy
at Cherchell , Algeria Algeria
But at the same
time, and to illustrate the ambivalence of the situation, relations between
Gaddafi and the Algerian regime have been difficult ever since the Libyan
colonel came to power in 1969. That this country of miniscule population, led
by a quixotic and unpredictable dictator, could pose as a rival to Algeria ’s dominance of the Maghreb and the Sahel
region, was a constant source of annoyance to the ruling group in Algiers
6th
Paragraph
In the background to
this situation lies the fact that Algeria has a problem of legitimacy stemming
from the fact that what began as a revolutionary movement against the French
occupation — the National Liberation Front (FLN) — morphed over the years into
a military dictatorship ruling over a state. The present president, Abdel Aziz
Bouteflika, is the last of the original leaders of the FLN. With an ageing and
ill president, it seems necessary for Algeria Algeria
“Iran ’s
Battle for Africa ”,
September 2013
17th ,
18th Paragraphs
What kind of power
does Iran North Africa . Much of it comes through the Straits of
Hormuz, the Suez Canal and through pipelines across Iraq Libya , Tunisia ,
Algeria and Morocco also carry natural gas into Europe . Several European companies want to support a
project to build a gas pipeline from Nigeria
to Algeria so Europe can get
more of its natural gas from Africa .
To disrupt this
trade, Iran Iran can gain enough power in these areas—a goal
it is working toward—it can hold Europe to
ransom.
20th,
21st Paragraphs
When we examine
southern European countries on their own, we see an even more disturbing picture.
In Spain Italy Libya
“Germany
okays 10 bln euro defence deal with Algeria
1st Paragraph
The German
government's security council has given the green light for German companies to
sell defence equipment worth about 10 billion euros over the next 10 years to Algeria
There are four
projects worth a total of about 10 billion euros ($14.2 billion) over 10 years,
the source said.
“Out of Iran ,
Into Africa: Hezbollah's Scramble for Africa ”,
June 2013
3rd Paragraph
On June 20, 2012,
two Iranian nationals, Ahmad Abolfathi Mohammad and Sayed Mansour Mousavi, were
arrested in Nairobi , Kenya
5th,
6th Paragraphs
More recently it
became clear that Nigeria , Africa 's most populous nation, has become a hotbed for
Iranian/Hezbollah terrorist activities. There were signs of Nigeria emerging as a potential site of interest
back in 2004 when, according to Israeli sources, an Iranian diplomat was
arrested on suspicion of spying on the Israeli embassy in Nigeria ’s capital Abuja
This February, Nigeria’s State Security Service (SSS)
arrested, Abdullahi Mustapha Berende and two other Nigerians
accusing them of being members of a terrorist cell, trained in Iran , who planned to attack U.S.
10th
Paragraph
The tempo of arrests
continued to accelerate. Barely weeks later, in the second half of May 2013,
Nigerian authorities arrested four Lebanese men in the northern city of Kano Nigeria
16th,
17th, 18th Paragraphs
Ali Ibrahim al Watfa
was described as "the permanent Hezbollah liaison to Sierra Leone " and responsible for a
Hezbollah cell in the Freetown area,
coordinating the transfer of funds from Sierra
Leone to Hezbollah in Lebanon
Abbas Loutfe Fawaz,
"Hezbollah's leader in Senegal ",
built his activities in Senegal
since 2006 using supermarkets in Dakar that he
owned and operated in Dakar Lebanon
the possibility of sending Lebanese nationals from Senegal
to Lebanon
Ali Ahmed Chehade is
the "Hezbollah Foreign Relations Department official for Cote d'Ivoire ," responsible for
coordinating the travel of Hezbollah members between Senegal
and Cote d'Ivoire
“Iranian Azim Aghajani convicted over Nigeria
1st ,
2nd, 3rd Paragraphs
Rockets, mortars and
grenades were among the weapons seized from a ship which docked in Lagos
Court documents said
they were due for re-export to The Gambia, in defiance of a UN arms embargo on Iran
Nigerian Usman Abbas
Jega was convicted alongside Azim Aghajani, who is alleged to be a member of Iran
“Iranians rally to protest Shia killing in Nigeria
1st ,
2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th Paragraphs
Iranians have staged
demonstrations in the capital, Tehran, and several other major cities across
the country to condemn Nigerian military’s bloody crackdown on the Shia Muslim
community in the African country.
The protesters
chanted slogans and carried placards in condemnation of the international
community’s silence on the massacring of the oppressed Nigerian Muslims.
Local media said on
December 12 that more than a dozen people were killed after clashes
erupted between the Nigerian army and Shia Muslims in the northern city of Zaria in Kaduna
State
The clashes broke
out when Nigerian soldiers opened fire on the people attending a religious
ceremony at Hussainiyyah Baqeeyatullah, a religious center belonging to the
Islamic Movement of Nigeria Nigeria
9th
Paragraph
Meanwhile,
a senior Iranian cleric on Friday condemned the recent bloody terrorist
attacks against Shia Muslims in Nigeria
“The
Rebellion of the Tuareg Warriors in 2012”
“North Africa ’s
Menace : AQIM's Evolution and the U.S. Policy Response”
Page 2
In its earliest
manifestation, AQIM was organized around the goal of ousting the “apostate”
junta in Algeria Algeria into
the Maghreb and the Sahel . While it has
wrapped itself in the banner of global jihad, AQIM remains largely an Algerian
organization focused on Algeria and North Africa . Understanding AQIM requires at least a
brief historical excavation of its origins in the anti-colonial and anti-French
context of Algerian politics of the early 1990s. It also requires understanding
the connections of some AQIM leaders to the anti-Soviet jihad inAfghanistan in
the 1980s. The anti-European, local, and anti-colonial dimension of AQIM’s
history appears to be the group’s core driver, but the shared background of its
leaders as mujahedeen in Afghanistan links it to a broader global current of
Islamist militancy that also encompasses the core of Al Qaeda. These two
interwoven strands of its historical origins are essential to understanding the
group’s current nature and future direction.
Prior to 2007, AQIM
went by the name Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). In
the late 1980s, the Algerian government undertook reforms ostensibly intended
to open up the largely authoritarian, one-party system that had held power
since Algeria won
its independence from France
Page 3
Meanwhile, Bin Laden
was increasingly seeking to export his brand and encourage the development of
like-minded jihadi offshoots elsewhere in the world. Al Qaeda leaders in
Pakistan were also seeking to exploit longstanding tensions in France over the
rights of French Muslim citizens, many of whom were from Algeria, by denouncing
the French government’s allegedly anti-Muslim policies. Ayman al-Zawahiri, then
Bin Laden’s deputy, for example, declared that France
Page 4
AQIM’s relationship
with core Al Qaeda is essentially a marriage of convenience. The two groups can
share the same basic jihadist outlook and gain from cooperation without sharing
exactly the same goals or adopting the same strategies to achieve them. The
groups can benefit from cooperating without any strict convergence in their
intentions. They can share the same basic ideas but have very different
capabilities
More fundamentally,
even if Droukdal and others share a common background with Al Qaeda in Pakistan France rather
than theUnited States Algiers
Of course, AQIM
members detest the United
States Pakistan Africa demonstrated
growing reach, continued resilience, and the type of energy that wins recruits.
AQIM, in other words, supports Al Qaeda’s global aspirations by its very
existence; it need not attack the West to do so. Spawning affiliates also
offered Bin Laden the hope of divertingU.S. and allied counterterrorism
resources away from Pakistan United States and its allies from Pakistan
Page 8
AQIM today is thus
increasingly fragmented. Similarly, the nature of its relationship with other
militant and criminal groups in the region is fluid and changing with
circumstance. AQIM’s cooperation with the Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram
and its offshoot Ansaru has attracted recent attention— in large part because
the perpetrator of the attempted 2009 “Christmas bombing,” Omar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, was a Nigerian. Abdulmutallab, however, was linked to Al Qaeda
via AQAP (Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula )
and the relevance of his Nigerian background is limited. AQIM’s cooperation
with Boko Haram and Ansaru also appears to have focused more on kidnappings and
roadside attacks than on sophisticated terrorist techniques.
“Towards an
Alliance Between Russia
and ISIS ”?
“Iran 's Awkward Diplomacy in Africa ”,
March 2016
1st
Paragraph
Iran’s deputy
foreign minister for Arab and African affairs, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, promised this week that Tehran
would “update” its Africa strategy, pursuing a
“new level” of strategic relations in the coming years. The timing is somewhat
puzzling, as President Hassan Rouhani has shown little interest in Africa . Above all, he is interested in securing foreign
investment and technological know-how to help jolt the ailing Iranian economy;
African countries are not on the list of priorities. Meanwhile, the latest
major development in Iranian-African relations saw former ally Sudan make a
complete U-turn, backing Riyadh in its current standoff with
Iran. The Sudanese case has left a sour taste among political elites in Tehran , who believe African states are unreliable partners
and will walk out on Iran
“Desperate
For Allies and Secret Assets, Iran
Penetrates Africa ”, August 2013
“Iran
and Sudan Begin to Execute
Moves to Dominate Central & Western Africa ”,
July 2013
The Central African
Republic has become a key player, working under Sudanese and Iranian direction,
in jihadist action, geared to take advantage of the West's declining influence
in Western and Central Africa, even if it challenges the interests of their
traditional ally, the People's Republic of China.
The governments of Iran and Sudan
are preparing for a major strategic surge into western Africa, into both the
Sahel and the shores of the Gulf
of Guinea Iran ’s
and Sudan ’s major sponsor,
the People’s Republic of China
The ultimate
objective of this surge is to consolidate control and/or influence over this
extensive region and its considerable oil, gas, uranium, and other minerals
(rare metals and rare earth) reserves. At the same time, the surge would
pre-empt and prevent both the US/West/NATO presence and the spread of
anti-Shi’ite takfiri-jihadist entities.
The surge is of such
importance to both Iran and Sudan that they are willing to risk a crisis
with their primary great power sponsor, the People’s Republic of China West
Africa .
Iran’s clerical
Government has sought to become a major power in West Africa since the early
1980s, once the Khomeini Administration consolidated its domestic power base
after the fall of the Shah in 1979. From the beginning, Iran worked in close cooperation with
radicalized members of the Lebanese Shi’ite community along the shores of the Gulf of Guinea Iran ’s
main partner in Africa has been Pres. Umar
Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir’s Sudanese Government.
However, greater
global developments since the turn of the 21st Century affected the regional
ascent of Iran and Sudan Tehran and Khartoum
As well, Iran could not ignore the intense US-led Western
anti-terrorism activities in the Sahel in the
aftermath of 9/11. Therefore, both Tehran and Khartoum Tehran Iran
and its local HizbAllah allies focused on building long-term infrastructure,
clandestine networks, and underground weapon caches throughout West Africa . Toward this end, Iran
delivered several huge weapon consignments by ship to Gulf of Guinea
Meanwhile, Sudan returned to focusing on its traditional
zone of influence in the Horn of Africa with Iran
monitoring closely from its military and intelligence facilities in Assab,
south Eritrea
Iran, however, did
not disengage completely from the growing upheaval and insurrection in the Sahel . Throughout the period of relatively low profile in
the first years of the 21st Century, Iran
remained the primary source of munitions, explosives, and other military goods
for all anti-government forces irrespective of their ideologies all over West Africa . Most insurgencies could not have been sustained
logistically and militarily without the Iranian supplies. Consequently, Iranian
intelligence was able to establish presence on all the continental lines of
communications, as well as establish good relations and operational cooperation
with all subversive forces in this vast area irrespective of their goals and
motives. Almost all of these munitions and weapons were pushed into West Africa
via Sudan , where Iran
In Spring and Summer
2011, the huge stockpiles of weapons which Qadhafi had built for sponsoring
“liberation wars” in Africa started falling
into jihadist hands. Many of these jihadists were protégés of Iran ’s Quds Forces, while many others received
shelter and support in Bashir’s Sudan Chad , as well as several convoys to their
brethren in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula .
However, far greater
quantities of chemical weapons, missiles, rockets, small arms, ammunition, and
other military equipment went to Sudan Sudan
who entered Libya Sudan
The Iranian-Sudanese
surge into west Africa seemed to be on track again.
Iran has been
adamant about controlling the extensive uranium deposits in the Sahel for its
own nuclear program, as well as about denying the oil and rare metals to the
West while expediting Chinese access in return for strategic favors. The French
and US military intervention
against the jihadist insurrections in the Sahel
in early 2013 only reinforced the Iranian and Sudanese resolve to vastly expand
their own operations across the entire west Africa.
However, there was a
new twist in the Iranian-Sudanese strategy.
In addition to
reinforcing support for, and cooperation with, AQIM and other jihadist groups, Khartoum , fronting for an invisible Tehran Khartoum
Increasingly
frustrated and concerned at the heavy-handed US and Western intervention,
several governments expressed strong interest in the Sudanese mediation
offers.
Meanwhile, Iran continued focusing on its growing
involvement in the war in Syria
Starting in early
2013, Tehran became apprehensive about a US-led
NATO military intervention in Syria Iran
is the consolidation of a Shi’ite-dominated on-land axis from Iran via Iraq
and Syria all the way to the
HizbAllah bastion on the shores of the Mediterranean .
The consolidation and sustenance of this axis has cost Iran Tehran
is cognizant that the launch of a major air campaign against Syria Iran ’s
brewing rift with HAMAS in both Gaza and Syria makes the alternate on-land route via
Palestinian-dominated northern Jordan
Hence, the possible
strategic changes in the Middle East made it imperative for Iran to establish alternate supply routes for
HizbAllah and Syria via the Mediterranean . These supply routes would be by ship, from
Sudan via the Suez Canal to
the Levant . Thus, Tehran
decided to vastly expand the forward storage and supply base in Port Sudan in order to better and quicker sustain the war
effort in Syria and Lebanon
Initially, Iran and Sudan
agreed to simply expand and upgrade the forward base for the supply of the
HAMAS and other jihadist entities in the Gaza Port Sudan in the aftermath of the Israeli bombing of the
Yarmuk missile factory and missile depots near Khartoum Port Sudan would
enable Iran
In May 2013, there
was a sudden sense of urgency in Tehran because
of developments in West Africa .
The Nigerian security
forces exposed an HizbAllah network in Nigeria Tehran Gulf of Guinea
(The capture in
Nigeria in late October 2010 of the Iranian weapons ship, whose key operatives
were convicted and sentenced by coincidence also in May 2013, convinced Tehran
that use of smuggling operations via seaports was a too risky a route even
though they enable larger weapon shipments.) Iran
and Sudan concluded that the
military infrastructure in Sudan
Thus, Iran ’s decision to surge westward across western
Africa all the way to the coasts of the Atlantic was the dominant factor behind
the strategic changes in Sudan
The pace of
construction of the Iranian military facilities throughout Sudan Port Sudan
In mid-May 2013, the
IRGC units started the construction of fencing, watchtowers, and
fortifications, as well as the construction of fortified air-defense positions
where SAM batteries would be deployed.
By now, the extent
of the Iranian-Sudanese activities is difficult to conceal.
Khartoum and Tehran
increasingly worry that Israel, the US, or other Western powers, are closely
monitoring progress and even might attempt to sabotage the new port facilities.
Iranian security experts warned that their new facilities were virtually
adjacent to Port Sudan
In mid-May 2013,
South Sudan was to start exporting its oil through the oil loading facilities
in Port Sudan
Hence, on June 8,
2013, Sudan ’s Pres. Omar
al-Bashir suddenly announced the halting of the export of South Sudanese oil
via Sudan Khartoum
Bashir then turned
back to the cheering public and explained that his decision was in response to
South Sudan’s continued funding of rebels in the southern parts of Sudan
“Sudan will not
allow revenues from oil exports from South Sudan to be used to buy arms for
rebels and mercenaries,” Bashir declared. It was a public politics undertaking
designed to maximize political rewards for Bashir. Despite pressure by the US , the PRC and several world powers on Khartoum to abide by the March 2013 agreement between Juba
and Khartoum Port Sudan
Protests from Beijing , long a major patron of Sudan
and a consumer of South Sudanese oil, were ignored by Khartoum
Meanwhile, hectic
preparations were, by late June 2013, taking place in Khartoum
for the escalation of the surge into western Africa .
Both Iran and Sudan consider the Central
African Republic (CAR) a crucial venue because the CAR
permits movement westward around the chaos in Darfur
and the French presence in N’Djamena. Moreover, Bangui
provides quick access to the Gulf of Guinea , as well as to the sub-Sahelian east-west
roadway which passes through the region’s main capitals — those which Khartoum has been recently courting — all the way to Dakar
On June 17, 2013,
Pres. Omar al-Bashir of Sudan
and President Michel Djotodia of the Central
African Republic oversaw in Khartoum
a series of secret multi-national discussions which would now facilitate a
dramatic break-out westward for Sudan ,
Iran
Djotodia is the
first Muslim to lead the CAR, significant since only 15 percent of the
population is Muslim and most of them practice tribally-influenced offshoots of
Islam. Djotodia, in contrast, was a councilor in the CAR Embassy in Sudan but based in Darfur
where he was converted to Islamism-jihadism by his Sudanese hosts. He is
convinced in the Sudanese tenet that a strong jihadist kernel is indispensable
to ensuring the loyalty and cohesion of any revolutionary movement irrespective
of its openly declared ideology or policy.
Indeed, the key
internal security and intelligence positions in Djotodia’s Seleka coalition are
held by fellow jihadists and their own stalwart tribal-jihadist militias.
Hence, Djotodia is convinced he is beholden to Bashir’s Sudan
Back in early 2013, Khartoum convinced Djotodia to renege on his
understandings with Paris and Bangui :
the January 2013 Libreville Bangui
Djotodia did not
forget Khartoum, and soon after assuming power in Bangui started sending
quantities of CAR diamonds to his friends in the Khartoum-backed Janjaweed
militias in Darfur to help fund their genocidal struggle.
Subsequently,
Djotodia moved quickly to transform the CAR into a “grey zone” at the heart of Africa .
The CAR is being
transformed from a de facto haven for various armed groups, due to lack of
governance in the remote areas, into a willing and active sponsor and
facilitator of revolutionary groups and criminal networks in order to further
undermine regional stability. Thus, while Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)
groups of varying size were tolerated in parts of the CAR since 2008, the
growing cooperation between Bashir and Djotodia changed the importance and rôle
of the LRA. In late April 2013, Joseph Kony was invited to Sudan and promised supplies and shelter in
return for military cooperation in both the CAR and Uganda
The CAR is thus
becoming a hub of subversion in the heart of the Africa
with geopolitical ramifications extending far beyond the borders and
capabilities of the CAR itself.
Thus, the June
17-18, 2013, visit to Khartoum Sudan ’s
commitment to supporting and economically sustaining the CAR in return for the
CAR’s playing a greater rôle in the continental designs of Iran and Sudan
Sudanese and Central
African senior intelligence officials discussed how to better utilize the LRA
in order to force the Ugandan forces out of the CAR.
The Sudanese and Central African Republic senior intelligence
officials also met in Khartoum with counterparts
from Chad
Most important is
the groundbreaking regional security agreement discussed and committed to on
June 17, 2013, by a large group of senior officials co-chaired by Bashir and
Djotodia. The Sudanese delegation was led by Defense Minister Abdelraheem
Muhammad Hussein, Presidential assistant and veteran intelligence senior
official Nafie Ali Nafie, and National Intelligence and Security Services chief
Mohamed Atta al-Mawla Abbas. Also around the table were delegations of senior
intelligence and security forces officials from the Central
African Republic , Chad ,
Egypt , Mali , and Mauritania
The delegations
discussed and agreed on close strategic cooperation to restore Arab-Muslim
preeminence to the entire region of West Africa .
The representatives committed to the consolidation of mutually loyal and
supportive regimes, as well as to assisting other regional countries to
establish Muslim-dominated governments and to have them join their alliance.
The senior officials discussed practical modalities for jointly breaking-away
from stifling Western influence and demands for reforms. They agreed on
cooperation in resolving security and economic crises and suppressing
democratic opposition forces.
Significantly, all
countries present also committed to helping Egypt
and Sudan in their “sacred
struggle” to sustain the Arab rights to and dominance over the Nile waters. Thus, the June 17, 2013, agreement
constituted a major and strategically profound shift in the regional posture
and assertiveness. If implemented, West Africa
will not be the same.
Thus, as the West —
led by the US and France — is contemplating the surge into the Sahel in order
to contain AQIM and other jihadist and tribal insurrections, the real challenge
will be the Iranian-Sudanese surge aimed to transform the entire West Africa
and deny it to the West. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and the other insurgencies will be but instruments of a grand strategic
design and surge.
“Kenya and Uganda
1st,
2nd, 3rd, 4th Paragraphs
The path—to serve Kenya , Uganda ,
South Sudan, and potentially Ethiopia Kenya
and the Lokichar Basin
from Hoima in western Uganda
before reaching the port city of Lamu
An alternative route
had the pipeline snaking through Kenya ’s
capital of Nairobi and on to Mombasa
The pipeline is part
of a broader regional project, the Lamu
Port Uganda is home to
sub-Saharan Africa ’s fourth-largest supply of
crude oil, with as much as 6.5 billion barrels discovered a decade ago. Kenya Ethiopia
6th Paragraph
The pipeline will
likely have to travel through swamplands, national parks, and wildlife reserves,
and parts of northern Kenya that are vulnerable to attacks by bandits or
Islamist militants, according to consultancy BMI Research, which estimates the
pipeline won’t be ready before 2020. A lack of skilled
labor, poor electricity supply, and the difficulty of importing material and
machinery into landlocked Uganda
“Post-Gadhafi Libya
now a jihadist springboard backed by Iran ,
Qatar , Sudan and Turkey
The consolidation of
a self-proclaimed Caliphate in eastern Libya
provides the jihadist camp with springboard into Africa and southern Europe .
That strategic
thrust, supported strongly by Qatar ,
Sudan , Iran , and Turkey
Although jihadist
forces occupied Tripoli in October 2011 — as a direct result of the Western
military intervention which helped bring down the Moammar al-Gadhafi
Administration in Libya — they failed to consolidate power and focus on
all-Islamist causes. Subsequently, Libya
Starting early 2014,
the jihad-sponsoring states have capitalized on the building chaos in order to
transform jihadist-held parts of Libya
into secure springboards for the spread of takfiri jihadism into both western
Africa and southern Europe .
By early 2015, Libya
Libyan jihadists
affiliated with global entities, foreign jihadists, and jihad-sponsoring states
played a decisive role in the victory of the Libyan uprising and the toppling
of the Gadhafi Government in 2011.
While NATO airpower
was instrumental in destroying Gadhafi’s military machine, the jihadist camp
was decisive in seizing power on the ground to the detriment of Libya Libya
As background Iran,
Sudan, and their proxies — mainly the Hamas and the Hizbullah — were the first
jihadist entities on the ground in eastern Libya in 2011, both helping the
anti-Gadhafi upsurge and finding out how they could benefit from the prevailing
chaos.
A few Iranian and
Sudanese officers had already arrived in Benghazi
from Sudan
In March 2011, the
IRGC established a high-level command center in Benghazi Persian Gulf .)
The on-site senior
Iranian operative was Ibrahim Muhammad Judaki of the Quds Forces contingent in Lebanon Israel near
Port Sudan , Sudan
The initial mission
was to expedite the purchase of weapons and ammunition for all anti-Western
jihadist forces. The Iranians brought with them several millions in hard
currency (dollars and euros). Special attention was paid to the purchase of
chemical warfare (CW) munitions for Hamas and Hizbullah.
The Sunni jihadists
— both Libyans and foreigners — who arrived to help their LIGF (Al-Jama’a
al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya: LIFG) brethren in Cyrenaica
quickly consolidate a jihadist bastion under the Emirate’s banner. One of the
key principles of the 2004/5 jihadist doctrine for localized jihads articulated
by Ayman al-Zawahiri and the Shura Kabira is to seize foothold for jihad, and a
possible base for the jihadist trend, anywhere possible and even if in
cooperation or partnership with non-Islamist elements. With Cyrenaica becoming
an important bastion of jihadism, as well as a gateway to Egypt, Sudan, the
Sahel, and southern Europe, it was imperative to further consolidate the
jihadist safe-haven the moment conducive conditions arose. The jihadists
quickly ensured that no future government of Libya
Indeed, the
jihadists immediately started to dispatch convoys of trucks full of weapons and
ammunition from eastern Libya
via Chad to AQIM (Al Qaida
in the Islamic Maghreb) bases in the Sahel (mainly Niger
and Mali
Meanwhile, in the
Autumn of 2011, the Libyan chaos served as a cover for the consolidation of
numerous jihadist entities focusing on other jihadist fronts. However, it took
the intervention of various jihad-sponsoring states — mainly Qatar , Turkey ,
and Iran — to transform the
jihadist victory in Libya
The number one
lesson which Doha drew from the Libya crisis — Qatar’s first real surge onto
the big-power politics — was that money was not enough, and that there was no
substitute to actual intervention on the ground in the subversive and military
operations.
Hence, Doha embarked on the building of a “jihadist Foreign
Legion” which would provide Qatar
The then-Qatari
Chief of Staff, Maj.-Gen. Hamad bin Ali al-Attiyah, personally oversaw the
military aspects of the program. The Commander in Chief was the Libyan jihadist
commander Abdel Hakim Belhaj. This nomination kept him away from the turmoil in
Libya Tripoli
Between early 2011
and early 2014, the Islamist jihadist world was consumed by a great theological
debate about their future in view of the grassroots intifadas which shook the Middle East . Osama bin Laden’s Shura Kabira never really
believed in the realistic prospects of enduring jihadist states as viable
sources for the spread of jihad, and rejected the concept as a viable goal
after the collapse of the Taliban’s Emirate in Afghanistan.
Although bin Laden
led the campaign to help the intifadas, he did not believe the nascent Islamist
states like then-President Mohammed Morsi’s Egypt
In contrast, a group of neo-salafi scholars considered the intifadas as the beginning of the fateful “End-of-TimeBattle ”
for the Middle East . According to tradition,
this apocalyptic battle would be waged in ash-Sham on the plain of Dabiq. The
scholars defined the theological prerequisites for expediting this battle in
what they called “the Khorasan Pledge”, starting with the imperative of a
jihadist caliphate.
In contrast, a group of neo-salafi scholars considered the intifadas as the beginning of the fateful “End-of-Time
The first such
Caliphate is being implemented in al-Jazira under the new “Emir of the
Faithful”, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Qurashi. Another key issue dividing the
jihadist world was cooperation with Shi’ite Iran
This profound
theological debate (within Sunni Islamism) slowed down the consolidation of the
jihadist springboards in Libya
The consolidation of
a jihadist Caliphate in eastern Libya
In March, a wide
coalition of jihadists — including the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, Hamas, and Al
Qaida — started building a Free Egyptian Army in eastern Libya
The “emir” of the
Free Egyptian Army (FEA) is Sharif al-Radwani. The Army’s liaison officer with
the Qataris is Abu-Ubaida, a veteran Al Qaida commander who had worked with the
Qataris in Libya , Syria
The initial
objectives of the FEA are to target vital installations, to storm prisons to
free Muslim Brothers detainees, and to make Sisi’s Egypt Egypt
Meanwhile, as of
Spring 2014, the theological character of the jihadist movement in Libya had been tied intimately to the
transformation of the jihadist movement in the Maghreb and the Sahel . No jihadist movement could escape the brewing
schism between the traditional jihadism represented by the Al Qaida supreme leadership
in Afghanistan-Pakistan and the ascent of takfiri jihadism spearheaded by the
Khorasan Pledge scholars and implemented by the KHI (Al-khilafa al-Islamiya or
the Islamic Caliphate) in al-Jazira.
In June 2014, AQIM
leaders sought to reconcile between the Al Qaida Shura Kabira and the Khorasan
Pledge scholars. In a June 22, 2014, communiqué, AQIM recognized Ayman
al-Zawahiri’s preeminence as “our Sheikh and Emir”, and urged DI’ISH to
reconcile. However, when AQIM’s appeals were rejected by the Al Qaida Shura
Kabira, AQIM announced its support for the DI’ISH.
On July 1, 2014,
Sheikh Abdullah Othman al-Assimi posted a video-message in the name of
al-Qaidat Jihad in the Maghreb and
Trans-Saharan Regions. Assimi, whose real name is unknown, is the organization’s
leader and a prominent Islamist jurist. His home base is in the mountains and
forests of Boumerdes and Tizi-Ouzou in Algeria
“My group wants to
build friendly ties with DI’ISH. You are dearer to us than our tribe and
family, and you will always have our support,” Assimi said. “We are still
waiting for Al Qaida branches across the world to reveal their stance and
declare their support for [DI’ISH].” Assimi alluded to his support for the
takfiri interpretations of the laws of jihad. “After the silence of the people
concerned, we wanted to show our stance for the sake of justice so that the
DI’ISH jihadists know that we will not fail them. We tell all Muslims that we
have seen justice in the DI’ISH approach and they are among the most obedient
of Allah’s people and the most dedicated to the Prophet.”
This was a very
important endorsement of the tenets articulated in the Khorasan Pledge.
Meanwhile, a group
of Libyan mujahedin, including veterans of the Syrian jihad, announced in
mid-June 2014 the formation of a takfiri jihadist group in eastern Libya Libya Darna
“We will cut off
heads, slit stomachs and fill Libya Libya
In late-July,
regional jihadist leaders met in southern Libya
in order to better coordinate operations, examine the possible unification of
Maghreb and Sahel groups, and agree on a
common position regarding the theological dispute between Zawahiri and Baghdadi.
The gathering included senior commanders from AQIM, Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia and Libya ),
Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (Egypt ),
El Mourabitounes and Ansar al-Din (northern Mali Sahel was palpable. The takfiri jihadists
vastly expanded recruitment of volunteers for fighting in the ranks of the KHI
in Syria-Iraq. They also oversaw the conversion of existing networks and groups
to takfiri jihadism.
The process has
accelerated by the return of combat veteran jihadists to the Maghreb and the Sahel .
Some of these
veterans assumed command of takfiri jihadist entities and raised the banner of
the Caliphate. Led by Algerian commander Luqman Abu Sakhr, the Tunisia-based
Uqba Ibn Nafi Brigade formally joined the KHI. The Brigade also claimed
responsibility for the July 2014 killing of 15 Tunisian Army soldiers on the
border with Algeria Maghreb has deviated
from the true path [of jihad]” he was pulling his men from affiliation with
AQIM. He announced the establishment of the Caliphate Soldiers in Algeria
Consequently, the
main regional commanders joined the preparations for the establishment of an
Islamic State in the Islamic Maghreb (ISIM).
Mokhtar Belmokhtar, currently the leader of the al-Murabitun in southern Libya Salvador
Triangle” in the no-man’s land formed by the borders of Libya , Algeria
and Niger Libya Sahel ,
providing expert training, organizing and equipping for several hundred
jihadists at any given time.
However, the most
important development affecting the jihadist trend in Libya , and the entire western Africa region, was
taking place in Khartoum
Starting in late
Spring 2014, Khartoum and Tehran
began to restore their surge into western Africa .
It was not a simple decision for Khartoum
because Sudan was by then
deeply involved in sponsoring and assisting a myriad of Sunni jihadist
movements throughout the Middle East . Some of
these groups were vehemently anti-Shi’ite and anti-Iran takfiri jihadist
groups. Moreover, Sudanese intelligence was closely cooperating with Turkish
intelligence and the key conservative Sunni
Gulf States led by Qatar
In Summer 2014, Sudan President Umar al-Bashir instructed the
entire national security and intelligence élite of Sudan
On July 1, 2014,
Bashir chaired a milestone meeting in Khartoum
with the country’s most senior military and security officials in which the
overall strategic posture of Sudan
Special attention
was paid to the strategic relations with Iran
and their impact on the situation vis-à-vis Libya
Gen. Yahia Muhammad
Kheir, the Minister of State for Defense, summed up Iran ’s
contribution to Sudan ’s
strategic capabilities and particularly the transfer of weapon systems from Libya
“Two-thirds of
Gadhafi’s sophisticated armaments are in our hands,” Kheir stated. Gadhafi
“didn’t use them because he lacked some technique [ie: technical expertise],
but our experts in collaboration with the Iranian experts managed to develop
some missiles [and make them operational].” Lt.-Gen. Ismail Breima Abdel-Samad,
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, added that the Iran-built Kenana Air Base
south of Khartoum
“Kenana Air Base is
place[d] underground and designed with highly advance technologies and proper
security measures. This is where we store all the cargos of weapons we receive
from our friends.”
Bashir summed up the
discussions by asserting Sudan Sudan ’s continued involvement in Libya Qatar and Iran Chad
In conclusion,
Bashir emphasized that Sudan ’s
international relations must always be second to “our relations with Iran , and the Muslim Brothers, and the salafi-jihadist
movements that are financed by Iran
and Qatar Sudan “cannot change our
relations with Iran Khartoum America
On Aug. 31, 2014,
the entire leadership met in Khartoum Iran
were to remain the crux of Sudan
“I shall start with
our relationship with Iran Iran Alliance
Gen. Siddiq Amer,
the Director-General of Intelligence and Security, concurred and stated that “Iran Iran Sudan
Gen. Yahya Muhammad
Kheir, the Minister of State for Defense, raised the possibility of cooperating
with the Gulf States on issues that include Africa .
The intelligence
services of several Gulf States were seeking Sudan’s help with intelligence and
contacts because the Gulf States did not know anything about the Islamist
groups in Libya, Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, and the North African Arab Countries.
Kheir recommended that Khartoum cooperated with
the Gulf States to the extent that Sudanese
interests were furthered and that Sudan Iran for a relationship with the Saudis and the Gulf States Gulf
States and Iran Gulf
States
The meeting also
delved into Sudan ’s
relations with the jihadist forces in Libya
and their impact on Sudan ’s
growing cooperation with Qatar
and Turkey in sponsoring
jihadist forces throughout Africa . Hussein
explained that practical cooperation had already begun in Libya Sudan ’s unique role as a mediator between Iran Qatar to support Libya
Gen. Imad al-Din
Adawy, the Chief of Joint Operations, elaborated on the latest developments in
the cooperation with and in Libya Chad Libya
Dawn Forces) in Tripoli Qatar and Turkey Turkey
and Qatar
Amer pointed out to
the prospects for long-term relations with Libya Sudan would not only dominate Islamist-jihadist Tripoli , but also open the back door for Iran
Meanwhile, Summer
2014 saw the building of relations and cooperation between the intelligence
services of Iran , Sudan , Qatar ,
and Turkey in Libya and the acceptance of the central and unique
role of Sudan
The Libyans
nominated Ahmad al-Zuway, an Ikhwan official with tribal links in Sudan , as the front man for the
military-intelligence cooperation with Sudan Sudan to Kufra (in the southeast of Libya ’s Cyrenaica
region). Consequently, the Ikhwan could expand the jihadist Dawn militias with
fighters, weapons and ammunition from Sudan
During the Summer, Sudan Libya ’s
various jihadist militias became increasingly dependent on supplies flown from Sudan over the Sahara .
As the jihadist forces closed on Benghazi Sudan began to directly supply the jihadist Dawn
militias in the Tripoli
Transport aircraft
flew from Sudan , landed and
refueled in Kufra, and continued to the Tripoli airport of Mitiga Sudan
By Autumn 2014, Doha decided to institutionalize and formalize the
cooperation with Khartoum in order to ensure
that it was not banished from Libya
and other up-and-coming jihadist fronts, mainly in Africa .
During October 2014, Doha and Khartoum
The agreement covers
“training, formation, exchange of expertise, joint exercises, joint
investments, exchange of visits, promotion of cooperation between the two
armies, and the exchange of military studies on the level of military academic
institutions”. The agreement also provided for “the exchange of expertise in
logistics and industrial fields including detached service of officers and
experts along with the military medical cooperation”; that is, Qatari
participation in the Sudanese out of country endeavors. As part of the military
cooperation agreement, Qatar
committed to “supply Sudan Qatar committed to sponsoring and funding a
myriad of Sudanese (and Iranian) jihadist initiatives mostly throughout Africa .
It is understood in Doha that in the context of the new bilateral relations, Khartoum would intercede with Tehran
not to undermine the al-Thani rule in Qatar
and to continue to use Qatar
In late-November
2014, Maj.-Gen. Ghanim bin Shaheen led a large delegation of military and
intelligence officials on a followup visit to Khartoum Sudan Qatar and Sudan Sudan ’s Information Minister, Dr Ahmed Bilal,
arrived in Doha Qatar
and Sudan
Bilal was effusive
in his praise of official Qatar
Back in September
2014, 15 Qatar-sponsored KHI operatives led by an Egyptian and a Saudi Arabian
senior commanders arrived in Darna from Syria
via Turkey Iraq Libya Cyrenaica . Using the weapons and
funds received from Sudan ,
they built an 800-strong force operating at least six camps outside Darna as
well as a few large training facilities in the Green
Mountains for Libyan, Egyptian and foreign jihadists. By
mid-November 2014, they seized control of the entire city of Darna
On Dec. 12, 2014,
the Mujahedin Shura Council of Cyrenaica urged all Islamist forces to join a
coalition led by the Darna Caliphate, and all the Islamist militias in eastern Libya
The jihadists
celebrated the announcement with a military parade in Darna led by tanks and
technicals adorned with black flags. Combat proven commanders from Syria , Algeria ,
Tunisia and Egypt
With the Darna
Caliphate secure, Sudan and its allies — Qatar, Turkey, and, behind the scenes,
Iran — could capitalize on the huge stockpiles left there by the Gadhafi
Government in order to support African jihads. For example, the support for the
Boko Haram was put under a single manager: a coordinator for the
communications, weapons supplies and financing delivered from Libya via Sudan
In late 2014, Abu
Kudes was coordinating the delivery of weapons from stockpiles in Cyrenaica with the assistance of logistical experts from
Sudanese and Turkish intelligence. Qatari intelligence was funding all the
jihadist logistical operations in Cyrenaica .
By early 2015, the
uppermost leadership of the Islamic Caliphate started to openly highlight the
strategic importance of Libya Libya Libya
The essay explains
that “by the grace of God to Libya Libya looks upon the
sea, the desert, mountains, and six states: Egypt ,
Sudan , Chad , Niger ,
Algeria , and Tunisia
The author
emphasizes the unique potential of Libya
as a springboard for a jihadist invasion of southern Europe .
Libya, he writes, “has a long coastline and looks upon the southern Crusader
states, which can be reached with ease by even a rudimentary boat and note that
the number of ‘illegal immigration’ trips from this coast is massive, estimated
to be as high as 500 people a day, as a low estimate. According to many [of
these immigrants], it is easily possible to pass through Maritime Security
Checkpoints and arrive in cities. If this was even partially exploited and
developed strategically, pandemonium could be wrought in the southern Europe . It is even possible that there could be a closure
of shipping lines because of the targeting of Crusader ships and tankers.”
The essay concluded
by reiterating the geostrategic importance of Libya
to the expansion of the Caliphate in and beyond the Greater Middle
East . “My brothers, Libya ,
by the permission of God, is the key to Egypt ,
the key to Tunisia , Sudan , Mali ,
Algeria , and Niger Maghreb .”
The author urged the
takfiri jihadist trend to expedite the liberation of Libya
before the West realized the threat Libya
constituted itself and before the West would attempt to intervene anew in Libya
Not only will
pressure on the land of the Caliphate in ash-Sham be relieved, but the
territories of the Caliphate in ash-Sham, Iraq ,
and Hijaz will be linked with those of their brothers in Libya and the Islamic Maghreb
and the defeat of all regimes and tyrants in their way will be enabled. That is
not difficult for God.”
In February 2015,
the Caliphate in eastern Libya
The KHI uppermost
leadership concurred and facilitated the dissemination of the Libyan
Caliphate’s message in its primary venue, Al-Hayat Media. On February 15, 2015,
the Libyan Caliphate posted a graphic five-minute video titled “A Message
Signed With Blood To The Nation Of The Cross”. The video began with the
marching and beheading of 21 Egyptian Copts who had been recently kidnapped in Libya
A jihadist commander
dressed in military fatigues delivered the message in American-accented
English. “All praise is due to Allah the strong and mighty,” he declared at the
start of the video. “And may blessings and peace be upon the ones sent by the
sword as a mercy to all the worlds.” He connected the “End-of-Time Battle ” in al-Jazira with the decisive surge on
Christendom to be launched from Libya
“Oh people, recently
you have seen us on the hills of ash-Sham and Dabiq’s plain, chopping off the
heads that have been carrying the cross for a long time, and today, we are on
the south of Rome , on the land
of Islam , Libya
“All Crusaders:
safety for you will be only wishes especially if you are fighting us all
together. Therefore we will fight you all together. The sea you have hidden
Sheikh Osama bin Laden’s body in, we swear to Allah, we will mix it with your
blood.”
After the jihadist leader finished his declaration, the line of mujahedin commenced the beheading of the 21 Copts kneeling in front of them. Once the slaughter was over, the commander stepped forward for a final statement.
After the jihadist leader finished his declaration, the line of mujahedin commenced the beheading of the 21 Copts kneeling in front of them. Once the slaughter was over, the commander stepped forward for a final statement.
“And we will conquer
Rome
“Chad–Cameroon
Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project”,
1st,
2nd Paragraphs
The Chad–Cameroon
Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project is a controversial project to
develop the production capacity of oilfields nearDoba in southern Chad,
and to create a 1,070-kilometre (660 mi) pipeline to transport the oil to
a floating
storage and offloading vessel (FSO), anchored off the coast
of Cameroon, near the city of Kribi.
It is operated by ExxonMobil (40%) and
also sponsored by partners forming the consortium, Petronas (35%) and Chevron (25%).
The governments of Chad and Cameroon
It was largely
funded by multilateral and bilateral credit financing provided by Western
governments. The International
Finance Corporation, the private-sector arm of the World Bank, provided $100 million of debt-based
financing, and France's export credit agency COFACE and the U.S.Export-Import
Bank each provided $200 million; private lenders coordinated
by the IFC provided an additional $100 million.[2]
“North Africa ’s Menace : AQIM's Evolution and the U.S.
Policy Response”
Page 2
In its earliest
manifestation, AQIM was organized around the goal of ousting the “apostate”
junta in Algeria Algeria into
the Maghreb and the Sahel . While it has
wrapped itself in the banner of global jihad, AQIM remains largely an Algerian
organization focused on Algeria and North Africa . Understanding AQIM requires at least a
brief historical excavation of its origins in the anti-colonial and anti-French
context of Algerian politics of the early 1990s. It also requires understanding
the connections of some AQIM leaders to the anti-Soviet jihad
inAfghanistan in the 1980s. The anti-European, local, and anti-colonial
dimension of AQIM’s history appears to be the group’s core driver, but the shared
background of its leaders as mujahedeen in Afghanistan links it to a broader
global current of Islamist militancy that also encompasses the core of Al
Qaeda. These two interwoven strands of its historical origins are essential to
understanding the group’s current nature and future direction.
Prior to 2007, AQIM
went by the name Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). In
the late 1980s, the Algerian government undertook reforms ostensibly intended
to open up the largely authoritarian, one-party system that had held power
since Algeria won
its independence from France
Page 3
Meanwhile, Bin Laden
was increasingly seeking to export his brand and encourage the development of
like-minded jihadi offshoots elsewhere in the world. Al Qaeda leaders in
Pakistan were also seeking to exploit longstanding tensions in France over the
rights of French Muslim citizens, many of whom were from Algeria, by denouncing
the French government’s allegedly anti-Muslim policies. Ayman al-Zawahiri, then
Bin Laden’s deputy, for example, declared that France
Page 4
AQIM’s relationship
with core Al Qaeda is essentially a marriage of convenience. The two groups can
share the same basic jihadist outlook and gain from cooperation without sharing
exactly the same goals or adopting the same strategies to achieve them. The
groups can benefit from cooperating without any strict convergence in their
intentions. They can share the same basic ideas but have very different
capabilities
More fundamentally,
even if Droukdal and others share a common background with Al Qaeda in Pakistan France rather
than theUnited States Algiers
Of course, AQIM
members detest the United
States Pakistan Africa demonstrated
growing reach, continued resilience, and the type of energy that wins recruits.
AQIM, in other words, supports Al Qaeda’s global aspirations by its very
existence; it need not attack the West to do so. Spawning affiliates also
offered Bin Laden the hope of divertingU.S. and allied counterterrorism
resources away from Pakistan United States and its allies from Pakistan
Page 8
AQIM today is thus
increasingly fragmented. Similarly, the nature of its relationship with other
militant and criminal groups in the region is fluid and changing with
circumstance. AQIM’s cooperation with the Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram
and its offshoot Ansaru has attracted recent attention— in large part because
the perpetrator of the attempted 2009 “Christmas bombing,” Omar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, was a Nigerian. Abdulmutallab, however, was linked to Al Qaeda
via AQAP (Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula )
and the relevance of his Nigerian background is limited. AQIM’s cooperation
with Boko Haram and Ansaru also appears to have focused more on kidnappings and
roadside attacks than on sophisticated terrorist techniques.
“The
Iranian-Saudi Proxy Wars Come to Mali”, August 2015
“South Sudan – Oil”
“Nigeria ,
Algeria agree to build Sahara gas link”, July 2009
1st
, 2nd Paragraphs
The idea of piping
gas thousands of kilometres across the Sahara was
first dreamt up more than 30 years ago, but the project remained on the drawing
board pending a concrete agreement between neighbouring states and a clear
funding plan.
7th
Paragraph
France's Total (TOTF.PA), Royal Dutch Shell (RDSa.L) and Russia 's
Gazprom (GAZP.MM) have all expressed interest in
helping Nigeria 's state-run
NNPC and Algeria
Gazprom and NNPC
agreed to invest at least $2.5 billion to explore and develop Africa 's biggest oil and gas sector, including building
the first part of the Trans-Sahara pipeline. [ID:nLO549518]
Some analysts
see Russia's
keen interest in Nigeria as
an attempt to maintain its grip on Europe 's
natural gas supplies.
“Iran
“Sudan and Egypt
1st,
2nd, 3rd, 4th Paragraphs
The budding new
relationship between Sudanese and Egyptian leaders is proving to be a curious
one.
Sudanese President,
Omar al-Bashir and his Egyptian counterpart, Abdel Fatah al-Sisi met on
Saturday in Cairo Khartoum
Reflective of the
complexity and confusion in the wider region, where alliances are forged,
broken and forged again as circumstances change, these two neighbouring
countries, historically intertwined since antiquity, have been at odds after Egypt Libya
The Sudanese regime,
led by an Islamist movement is accused of supporting Islamist rebels in Libya Egypt
“How
al-Qaeda and Islamic State are competing for al-Shabaab in Somalia
“Iran
“France to send heavy weapons to Iraq
“French
jets bomb ISIS stronghold of Raqqa ,
Syria
“Paris terror attacks: ISIS bombed by France
1, 2,
3, 4 Paragraphs
The new strikes,
which were carried out in the stronghold of ISIS in Raqqa , Syria
Carried out
overnight, the strike included 10 fighter jets which were launched from the United Arab Emirates and Jordan
It comes after
French president Francois Hollande declared yesterday that France
“France
1st, 2nd
, 3rd, 4th , 5th , 6th Paragraphs
Dramatic new details
of France
Three executives of France 's largest oil corporation have been
charged in Paris over claims that they funnelled
millions of dollars through a Swiss company in order to bribe officials to gain
oil deals in Iraq and Russia
The disclosure will
embarrass President Jacques Chirac as it follows on from claims last week by
the Iraq Survey Group that Saddam indirectly paid French politicians and
individuals to gain support for lifting UN sanctions and influencing French
policy. The ISG's claims were dismissed by Chirac as politically motivated.
In the Nineties,
French oil companies Total and Elf-Aquitaine won the rights to develop the $3.4
billion Bin Umar project and the vast Majnoon field in southern Iraq Iraq US hawks
have accused France of opposing the Iraq
French investigating
magistrate Philippe Courroye, who has been probing these payments since 2002,
is examining the movements of funds between a Total subsidiary in Bermuda and a
Swiss company, Teliac SA. The Swiss firm is alleged to have served as an
intermediary for some $20 million in payments by the oil group into offshore
accounts in the Bahamas and Cayman Islands between 1996 and 2001. Courroye has not
given any details of what oil deals the alleged bribes were linked to. Total's
former head of operations, Jean-Michel Tournier, is alleged to have told the
French authorities the company used the Geneva-based firm to pay bribes to
'certain beneficiaries' in return for gaining access to reserves in Iraq and Russia
Total is known to
have carried out a sustained lobbying campaign with the Saddam regime with a
view to putting itself in prime position to gain from any lifting of UN
sanctions. Total confirmed that certain past and present employees had been
questioned but said this had been part of an investigation into money
laundering which was not aimed against Total itself.
“African
Nations Sign Deal for Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline”, July 2009
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5 Paragraphs
Nigeria's state oil
company said Nigeria, Algeria
and Niger signed an agreement
to create a $10 billion trans-Saharan gas pipeline to ship gas to Europe .
Managing director
Mohammed Barkindo said Friday the project was approved by energy ministers from
the three governments.
Nigeria's energy
minister, Rilwanu Lukman, said the countries are now looking for partners for
the project.
Europe currently
depends on Russia for much of its gas and is seeking new sources and routes,
and the European Union recently lent its support to the project.
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